Death: Whether We As Humans Should Be Fearful Of Death

Death. An inevitable process that results to a living thing ceasing to be alive. Death can also be defined as the permanent ending of life (Nagel 1979). A subject that most of us- if not all of us, is incline to tread around lightly or dread. Even though, the subject of death is crowded with the sense of fear, it remains one of the most fascinating topics in philosophy, probably due to it not being a definite sub field of philosophy. Being a concept like no other, a hand full of philosophers have discussed the subject of death comprehensively tackling whether death creates harm and if we should be fearful of it. These two criteria are not only probed philosophically but religiously, sharing a new light into the different possible interpretations of the subject of death. Religious connotations to the harmfulness of death, involve aspects such as an afterlife, purgatory and reincarnation, which give an interesting outlook into the evil of death. However, I will be taking the philosophical approach in answering whether we should be fearful of death, when taking into account of the Harm thesis, excluding many religious conceptions of death. I will also be focusing on death, excluding the harmfulness of the process of dying, which can be argued to be damaging and therefore a bad thing, as it is a process usually involving excruciating pain, suffering and fear. In addition, I will be exclusively including views that argue that life as a possible good or somewhat not bad, excluding whether mortality can be a bad or good thing. The question is whether death can be bad/harmful and how. By using evaluating this question, it will give us a clear reason/s to be fearful of death.

The Harm thesis states that death is bad for those who die and cause ‘harm’ to the deceased, a theory that is accepted by those who value life (Luper 2019). The word ‘harm’ can be categorised into two definitions – something that is bad for you or it could be related to the concept of pain, whether physically or psychologically. I will be using the first definition of ‘harm’, solely because the second definition would require the existence of the person for them to experience some sort of pain, which is the Existence Condition/Approach (later explored as a response against the Harm thesis).

This dissertation will include arguments in support of the Harm thesis, such as, The Deprivation Approach and comparativism. Arguments against the Harm thesis (The Existence Condition and the ‘Symmetry Approach’) will be explored through the Epicurean view on death, which argues that death is not bad for the person who dies, and it would irrational to fear death, as harm cannot be felt especially when dead (Feldman 1991). These two conflicting attitudes to the harmfulness of death lead us to consider the following question: Should we be fearful of death?

Ultimately, I will argue that we should be fearful of death, as it can be harmful to the deceased. To convey my point, I will start by explaining what the Harm thesis is, what arguments will be considered for and against the Harm thesis and proceed by first introducing the Epicurean arguments that go against the thesis. This will then lead me to state their flaws in opposing the Harm thesis, which will hopefully give a clear and concise reason to why we should be fearful of death.

Epicurean Arguments

In this part of my dissertation, I will be illustrating the Epicurean arguments that death is not harmful or bad for an individual who dies. The Epicurean view is divided into two arguments, one presented by Lucretius (a follower of Epicurus) and the other offered by Epicurus.

Death can be described as (according to Google) as ‘the destruction or permanent end of something or someone’ or ‘the action or fact of dying or being killed; the end of the life of a person or organism’. Straight away we can point out that, what these two definitions have in common when defining ‘death’, is that death consists of the permanent ending of an individual and them ceasing to no longer exist, suggesting that an individual can not ‘be’ dead, as they do not exist and are no more. This thought process is used to construct the Epicurean argument that questions and states death cannot be bad, as one does not and cannot experience death as harmful or its misfortunes or unpleasant experiences at all (e.g. Feldman 1991, Haslanger 2008). The general argument lead us to question what it means for something to be harmful to an individual and if there are different types of harm that are bad for the individual.

Overall, the Epicurus central argument can be presented with one quote formed by Epicurus himself who states:

‘So death, The most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.’ (Feldman 1991)

However, the same point can be explored in a different way. Suppose for whatever reason, we are able to find logical way to develop the view that death is harmful to the deceased. We are then faced with an Epicurean question: when is the deceased harmed? This question also entails who is harmed by death and what harm is caused, as well as what time harm is received. It would seem to be incorrect to suppose that harm is received to the individual while alive and existing, as they have evidently have not experienced death yet, resulting to no harm being received by death. This faces the problem of what harm is being caused and how death can be harmful. It is equally incorrect to suppose that harm is executed after an individual is no more, as no one is existing to sustain harm, as the decease does not exist, running into the problem of who is harmed by death. From this evaluation, it has been shown that there is no coherent solution to all three issues, leading Epicurus to reject the Harm thesis and challenging the common view that death causes harm, by illustrating that there is no reasonable explanation for when death is harmful for an individual. This is known as the ‘Existence Condition’ (e.g. Feldman 1991, Haslanger 2008).

The argument presented by Lucretius is used to show that the state that death puts us in (non-existence) is not bad at all, by thinking about the state before we were born:

Look back at time … before our birth. In this way Nature holds before our eyes the mirror of our future after death. Is this so grim, so gloomy? (Lucretius 1951)

The ‘symmetry argument’ is centred on the asymmetry in our attitudes towards the period of non-existence after dying and non-existence before being born. The argument starts of by stating that if we were willing to believe in the view that early death is causes us harm because it deprives us of certain goods, then we should be equally willing to state that late birth also deprives us of certain goods –‘ goods we would have enjoyed if we were born earlier’. Yet, nobody states that it is a misfortune that they were born ‘years or decades earlier’, concluding the whole argument (e.g. Feldman 1991, Haslanger 2008). The argument challenges the view that death is harmful by forcing the defender of death’s harmfulness to account for the asymmetry between our attitudes towards the two periods of non-existence.

Lucretius raises a point. Could it be we are deprived of possible opportunities and experiences that might have occurred if we had lived earlier, as well as opportunities and experiences we could have gained if we had lived longer than we had? If this view to be taken into consideration, is it reasonable to care about the possible experiences and opportunities we will miss after death than the ones missed because we were not born earlier/did not exist earlier? No. In fact, it would be irrational and unreasonable, due to the fact that the prolongation of being unborn is similar to the prolongation of our death/passing (Haslanger 2008).

Overall, the Epicurean line of thinking (arguments) attacks the harmfulness through the symmetry argument and the no subject-argument. The arguments challenge defenders of the Harm thesis to explain how death can be harmful for the deceased if they cannot experience anything (Feldman 1991). They also question at what moment death causes harm and how it can be that we seem to have this perception that non-existence after death is harmful and that it is a misfortune, yet we do not state that it is a misfortune and harmful to not exist ‘years or decades earlier’, despite both states deprives us of opportunities and can be equally harmful.

Evaluating Epicurean Arguments

I will now start evaluating the counter-arguments, supporting the Harm thesis against the Epicurean arguments.

Many would agree that death is a misfortune, and therefore we should be fearful of death. Especially when our response towards the decease is filled with sorrow and sadness. We cry at funerals and grieve our loved ones at their passing. Doesn’t these responses to death give us enough evidence that death causes harm and therefore should be feared, especially when it invokes emotions such as sadness? However these responses provoke the question: how can we be harmed if we do not exist during the time when it takes place?

To evaluate the Epicurean view, we need to address one of the prominent arguments against the Harm thesis, which is that we should not fear death, as we cannot receive harm or misfortune if we are dead, as we no longer exist. The Epicurean position seems to be stating that death cannot harm us at all, as in order to for something to be harmful; we need to experience it, dismissing the view that harm can still be caused without experiencing it directly. Therefore, in order to successful challenge this view that is mainly necessary in the no subject-argument, we should consider whether something could be bad without experiencing it and give cases where experience is not necessary in the harmfulness of something. Thomas Nagel argues against the Epicurean view, as he believes that an individual can still be harmed by something that does result in any unpleasant experiences for that particular individual. He uses what is called the ‘betrayal-behind-one’s back’ example to combat the ‘what he/she does not know, can not hurt them’, which is pretty self-explanatory, as the example consists of the betrayal of friends and people who were ones treated you with respect and kindness to constantly being ridiculed behind one’s back. He uses this example to demonstrate that one can in fact be harmed/hurt, even if he is not aware of it or experiencing it and especially when we have an intuition that it is bad for you, as a person, whether you discover the betrayal or not. The same can be applied to death, as knowledge or awareness of events that would be displeasing and bad for you if you were alive is not needed for it to be harmful for you.

However, a few philosophers (Stephen Rosenbaum and David Suits) have argued that against these types of examples that illustrate non-experienced badness/harmfulness. As Stephen Rosenbaum states that those who hold the view that death is not harmful, do not state that all harmful things have to be experienced, in order for it to be harmful. In fact, he tries to illustrate that the overall point is that they can be experienced. David Suits presents a similar point by conveying that some bad things have a tendency to evoke pain and mentions how it is similar to firing a gun, as the action has a tendency of causing some harm or has a chance of causing a risk. He also insinuates that the ‘betrayal-behind-one’s back’ example can be explained in this way and that in the example, your friends and the people around you put you at risk of being in pain and suffering. However, he suggests that death and post-mortem harms do not fit in the same category as the two examples as death has no tendency to evoke pain, this is due to Suits’ thinking that it is simply impossible and concludes that both are not truly harmful. John Fischer tries to combat this view by still using Nagel’s example, which was then adapted by Frankfurt who added a new feature. This new feature of Nagel’s betrayal example, consists of you imagining that your friends were to, in this case, hire a person named White who could always prevent the information of your friends and other people’s betrayal from you, it would then be impossible for you to experience any harm from their betrayal. Now what John Fischer is trying to prove is that, both the original example that Nagel presents and the Frankfurt-style version that Fischer has used with White have the same events. Therefore, it would be irrational to find the betrayal in Nagel’s case harmful, but not in the case with White, as they both contain the same theme of betrayal, as well as the same events. In conclusion, Fischer ends this view by suggesting that it would be only right, if we state that both cases are harmful for an individual, making experience redundant. David Suits has responded to this by arguing that the case with White should not constitute as betrayal. This is because there is a clear precaution in the case, which prevents an individual from finding out about the betrayal, making it impossible to cause harm to the individual.

However, imagine you were to find out the betrayal. Surely, you would feel pain and anguish, wishing that you never found out the betrayal? If so, this suggests that the betrayal can cause harm and misfortune (Cave, 2012). In conclusion, this shows that the possibility of being harm is still present even if do not experience a harm, in this case death.

The last thing a critic of the Harm thesis, can use to counter-attack non-experiential harms, in this case the ‘betrayal-behind-one’s back’ example, is that in the case of the dead, it is different because you no longer exist. This indicates that the only reason why you cannot be affected by harms when dead, is solely because you do not exist at all, and it is safe to say that you will not be in contact with any harms or misfortunes, as well as any benefits, as you cease to exist. This clarifies and adds another layer to David Suits’ argument against the betrayal example, as the reason why harms cannot affect the deceased is not because they cannot experience it; it is because they do not exist at all. But a reply to this is that, David Suits fails to take into consideration, that your interests can still be considered beyond your physical existence and awareness. But how so? How can our interests still be considered if we cease to exist? Suppose that Sally has put a lot of hard work into writing a newspaper article on the importance of keeping the world clean from waste for a local newspaper publisher. She decides to take a little vacation in a desert island to get away from her busy schedule. Using the non-experiential harm and having it in mind, if her newspaper article was to be burned or ripped apart, her efforts would have been wasted. This would cause her harm, even if Sally never hears of this loss. Now, suppose that just before this loss, Sally dies by drowning. Surely, it would be wrong to state that the destruction of her hard work is no longer harmful to her, just because she is no more. If we agree with this, it shows that events that happen after an individual’s death can harm the deceased and that existence is not required in order for the deceased to experience harm/misfortune. The idea that is being attacked by these examples (‘betrayal-behind-one’s back’ example and the Sally example) is that an event can only harm the deceased if they are physically and mentally aware at the time of the event, disregarding the events after death.

Going back to the ‘Symmetry Argument’ formed by Lucretius, the argument seems at first as a very clear and rational argument against the Harm Thesis. However, the argument provides two possible interpretations of death, whether the state we are in when dead or the ending of life. The first interpretation (the state we are in when dead) cannot be doubted, as we accept and agree on that we cease to exist before birth. The second interpretation (the ending of life) does not cause a problem, as the only thing that follows life is nonexistence. Overall, the ‘Symmetry Argument’ is a weak one, as it seems to misunderstand a key factor that the Harm thesis expresses. Lucretius misapprehends by believing that the thesis connotes to the state of nonexistence being harmful. Instead, the thesis actually suggests that death is harmful, as it brings something as good as life to an end, depriving us of good things, which is in result harmful. In addition, the two (nonexistence before birth and nonexistence after death) affect us differently. This is because birth is the beginning of something valuable and good; life, whereas death does the opposite, as it is the ending of life, bringing something good to an end.

Main Defence: The ‘Deprivation Approach’/Comparativism

I will now focus on the strongest argument that supports the Harm thesis, providing another problem for the Epicurean Arguments I have discussed about.

This leads us to the main and strongest defence for the view that we should be fearful of death, as it can cause some levels of badness and misfortune, siding with the Harm thesis – The Deprivation Approach. As one of the most popular theories on why death is harmful to the deceased, the approach states that ‘death is bad as it deprives one of certain goods’ that they would have had if they were not dead. To test whether this theory holds any value, we are required to compare between (a) the harm a person benefits if the person was to go on living and (b) those that would come to him/her if he/she were to die (Feldman 1991, Luper 2019). So to confirm that death is indeed a bad thing and should be feared, the comparison made should show that a person ‘would be worse off dead than he/she would be if living. In other words, in order to conclude that death is harmful for the deceased, we ought to compare the person’s welfare to the welfare he/she would have had if they were still living/alive (e.g., Feldman 1991, Luper 2019). This can be also referred to as a version of comparativism. To illustrate this concept, I will be using an example that involves working out Hilda’s actual welfare level and her welfare level if she was still alive and had not died. Suppose, that Hilda died on October 25th, 2008 at age 25, and that if she did not die, she would have lived for another 25 years, but suffered during her final five years. Applying comparativism to this, we would need to adopt positive hedonism for a simpler account of her welfare level. From this, we need to work out the sum of the total of the pleasure and pain she had in her lifetime. Supposing that she had experienced more pleasure than pain in her lifetime, we can specify that her lifetime welfare level (which is 25 years in total) is a value of 250 or came to the value of 250. Next, we have to work out the sum of the pleasure and pain she would have obtained if she had not died on October 25th, 2008. Therefore, as the first 25 years of her life would be a value of 250, it is accurate to assume that her next 25 years would also result to it coming to the value of 250. Let’s presume that her final five years, that she had mostly suffered, come to the value of -50. Finally, we can wok out the value of her welfare level if she had not died, which would have been 250+250-50=450. Now, we are aware that her (Hilda) lifetime welfare level if she had not died on October 25th, 2008 would have been a value of 450. However, to work out if death was in fact harmful for that person, in this case Hilda, we would need to perform one more step. This would be to subtract her lifetime welfare level (450) from her actual welfare level of 250, which would give us a value of -200, the value of her dying on October 25th, 2008. Consequently, according to comparativism, Hilda’s death was quite bad and harmful for her, in this case. If, however, the last 30 years of her life, she mostly faced agony, despair and torment, her death would have been good for her, in this case. Comparativism also can be applied to concerns, such as whether dying young is bad for the one who dies and whether death is always bad for us. Both concerns depend on how our lives would have been if we had not have died. Nonetheless, it is safe to state that usually dying young deprives us of many more good years, than if we were to die during our later years. So, dying young usually is bad for the person who dies. In conclusion, according to comparativism, death can be harmless, but it can also lead to the harm of the deceased. This is because death hinders us form gaining various intrinsic goods that we would have had if we were still living- the fundamental belief that the ‘Deprivation Approach’ consists of (Feldman, 1991). This approach is a problem for Epicurean arguments against the Harm thesis, this is because the approach illustrates that non-experienced state of affairs can strip us from certain goods, affecting our welfare level.

Conclusion

Throughout this essay, I have been trying to answer whether we as humans should be fearful of death, taking into account the arguments for and against the Harm thesis. To do this, I have been also answering whether death is a bad thing or can be a bad thing and what it poses against us. Answering these questions would provide me with the dangers death poses, suggesting that it is something that we ought to be afraid and wary of. I have now come to the conclusion that death can be a bad thing, especially due to the fact that it poses the ability to deprive us of certain goods. I have argued that there is a thing known as non-experienced badness/harms, through the use of various examples, such as Thomas Nagel’s ‘betrayal’ example. This example illustrates not only that one does not need to directly experience a misfortune for it to be considered harmful or bad for them, as a result, but that there can be cases something is bad and therefore harmful; for an agent, even though he/she cannot have bad experiences as a result. The ‘Frankfurt-type’ version of Nagel’s betrayal example is exactly this sort of example. By illustrating that non-experienced harms/badness is a thing, I have established that in order for a person to be harmed, they do not need to experience the misfortunate events directly. This attacks the ‘Existence Condition’, which is a view Epicureans have adopted stating that one cannot be harmed or face a misfortune, if they are dead. This is because they cease to no longer exist. The condition tries to imply that death cannot harm us at all, as in order for it to be somewhat harmful; we would need to experience it, directly and only directly. However, I have demonstrated mostly with the betrayal example that one can still be effected, in this case, negatively, even if they are not aware of it or not experiencing it. The same can be applied to death, as we have established that knowledge or awareness of events that would be displeasing and bad for you if you were alive is not needed for it to be harmful for you. I have then illustrated ways in which death can be a hindrance. This is because death deprives/hinders us of not only various goods but also interrupts our life projects, making death harmful and a misfortune. This is the ‘Deprivation Approach’, also can be known as Comparativism. I have presented this view by presenting an example (the Hilda’s example), which demonstrates that death can harm us by depriving us and leading us to miss certain positive future experiences. For example, in Hilda’s example, by working out and comparing her lifetime level (450) to her actual welfare level of 250, which resulted to the value of -200, if we were to subtract the two values from each other, we find out that her death, in this case, was quite bad and harmful for her. However, as I have stated before, the ‘Deprivation Approach’/Comparativsim suggests that death can, in fact, be harmful for the deceased, suggesting that they can also be certain circumstances, where ones death would be good for them. For example, the last 30 years of a person’s life could be filled with pain and anguish, so therefore it could be argued that death would be a good for the person, as it is safe to say that death would prevent them facing any of these negative experiences. In conclusion, according to comparativism, death can be harmless, but it can also lead to the harm of the deceased, depriving them of certain intrinsic goods gained through existing. I have also attempted to provide adequate answers to questions, such as how can death be bad/harmful for the deceased, if he/she does not exist when it occurs and when is death bad for the deceased. Lastly, by attacking Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument; I have established that is not irrational to fear death, especially posthumous non-existence. I have shown this by displaying that a defender of death’s harmfulness can state that birth is the beginning of something valuable and good; life, whereas death does the opposite, as it is the ending of life, bringing something good to an end. For that reason, the two types of nonexistence (nonexistence before birth and nonexistence after death) affect us differently, as one is seen as a beneficial and dear, in a way (nonexistence before birth), and another is seen as detrimental and unfortunate (nonexistence after death). The ‘Symmetry Argument’ also fails to recognise a key aspect of the Harm thesis. This key aspect refers to the thesis suggesting that death is harmful, as it brings an end to something, we consider as good- life, preventing us from gaining various goods. Lucretius misinterprets the thesis by implying that the thesis indicates that the state of nonexistence is harmful, resulting to the ‘Symmetry Argument’ being seen as a weak argument, due to this flaw. This leads us to finally tackle the main question of whether we as humans should be fearful of death. We can now conclude, with a simple answer of yes. This is due to the fact that, I have conveyed that there are various ways death can cause harm to its subjects, which are good enough reasons/justification to why death should be feared and can pose as a threat. These various ways that death can cause harm (depriving us of certain goods, interrupting/hindering our projects, putting an end to something which is good –life) successfully answer major objections (The Existence Condition, The ‘Symmetry Argument) to death’s harmfulness and badness suggesting that death can be a bad thing for the one who dies. As a consequence, we can confidently state that we as have humans are justified and it is more than reasonable for one to fear death, as we have come to a conclusion, that death can cause harm for those who are deceased.