Free Will And Its Connection To The Criminal Justice System

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In this essay I will be discussing one of the most popular topics in philosophy, free will; I will be expanding on how it can tie into the criminal justice system. Free will is largely argued, but one thing that should ultimately have the same meaning to everyone is justice. This paper isn’t meant to argue one way or another towards free will, but to explain one side of the idea that reasonable doubt is more important than just a standard for court. The interesting part is that there is a strong connection in philosophy and the justice system, which I will explain throughout this paper.

Free will is simply the theory that people have complete control over their actions. There are a few different arguments that object to this idea, such as God, some other higher power or entity, or the laws of nature. The main objection metaphysicians focus on is the last one listed, the laws of nature. Determinism is the idea that the laws of nature and existing causes are what lead to every event. If one believes in determinism then they believe that based on the laws of nature it is possible to infer what state everything encompassing the universe will be at any time and that whenever the universe was created our entire lives were already determined (Nay 2014). By this theory, we have never had the option to do anything then we have ever done, and will never have the option to do. In the Consequence Argument, Van Inwagen explains how free will and determinism cannot be compatible. His argument claims that if determinism really is true, then no one has ever had the power to change previously made decisions and that we are able to d

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Explain the Judge scenario

Though the free will is the main topic of this essay, providing a background of truth-conduciveness will better help the reader thoroughly understand my topic. Truth-conduciveness is important to the argument that is mentioned further along in this paper because without the two – do I need this

The judge scenario brings up an interesting idea, the effect free will can have on the criminal justice system, and more specifically in the trial. It is true that technically no one should be punished for how they act unless they are morally responsible, right? If that’s true then no one can be punished unless he had free will to commit a crime or an illegal action. Here is an argument to defend this:

  1. “If it can be reasonably doubted that someone had a free will with respect to some action, then it is a requirement of justice to refrain from doing serious retributive harm to him in response to that action.
  2. Anyone who believes the free will debate is philosophically valuable must accept that it can be reasonably doubted that anyone ever has free will.
  3. Therefore, anyone who believes the free will debate is philosophically debatable must accept that it is a requirement of justice to refrain from serious retributive harm” (Villhauer 2009, Pg. 131).

For premise one, if one did not have the option to act the way he did, then he would not be morally responsible because to have the grounds to punish someone they must have been morally responsible for a specific action, or for a previous action. When looking at the choices of an individual it is important to look at the premises of the argument. The only issue with the premises is that retributive harm will never be justified if the reasons for free will are too weak to be thought, or if there is any slight bit of reasonable doubt (Villhauer 2009). In the justice system, for one to be convicted for a criminal crime, the jury must believe the prosecutor proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed whatever crime he is on trial for. The fact that ties the justice system and this premise is that reasonable doubt is a standard in proving moral arguments for doing harm and for someone to be punished in a courtroom.

Citations

  1. Vilhauer, B. (2009). Free Will and Reasonable Doubt. American Philosophical Quarterly, 46(2), 131-140. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20464445

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