Impact of the Arab Spring on the Shift towards Post-Islamism in Turkey: Argumentative Essay

Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a poor street vendor in the hinterlands of Tunisia in December 2010, a series of pro-democracy protest movements erupted across seventeen Arab states, including Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, revealing the scope of mass discontent and coming to be known collectively as the Arab Spring (Hamzawy, 2016; Bayat, 2017: 8). These leaderless protests toppled Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, demonstrating to the region that despotic sheikhs, autocratic kings, and lifelong presidents could no longer hold their populations captive (Bayat 2017: 10). The tentative new order that emerged encouraged democratic competition at last, and many Islamist parties that had been previously banned quickly mobilised support networks and entered the political arena. The Tunisian experience suggests the Arab Spring did cause a shift towards post-Islamism, with the Ennahda Movement gradually transitioning to post-Islamism. The Egyptian experience, however, offers insights into the limits of the post-Islamist shift in the wake of the Arab Spring. Finally, it can be argued that the Islamist project was already running out of energy by the outbreak of the Arab Spring, suggesting the shift towards post-Islamism was already in motion.

Asef Bayat first introduced the term ‘post-Islamism’ in 1996, using it to describe the post-Khomeini social, political, and religious perspectives in Iran. During Khomeini’s leadership (1979-1989), he pursued ‘Islamism’, converting Iran to an Islamic State and building his government upon the notion of Valayat-i faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), such that the state could fulfil the broad Quranic dictum “command right, forbid wrong” (Bayat, 2015: 5; Bayat, 1996: 43). Islamism is thus defined by Sharia Law guiding an Islamic State, where Islam is in all aspects of life. An Islamist believes that Islam “has something crucial to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contrmporary ummah and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion as a matter of priority” (Volpi, 2010: 14). Post-Islamism has emerged from Islamism, characterised by the exhaustion of revolutionary ambition among the Islamists, the project of ‘Islamism’ has lost credibility and has been replaced by a new discourse of adaptation, moderation, and contention over the role of Islam in politics (Bayat, 2007; Roy, 2004). In the Iranian case, Bayat notes that post-Islamism means “a condition” where “the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters” (Bayat, 1996: 45). Olivier Roy stresses “the precedence of politics over religion”, whereby ‘Islamism’ is no longer focused on establishing an Islamic State, as was the goal for Islamists Mawdudi, Qutb, and Khomeini. Roy makes his argument in primarily negative terms, focusing on the ‘failure of political Islam’, whereas Bayat argues post-Islamism is a result of Islamist reflection and triumph of liberal rights. Bayat takes the argument further, claiming that post-Islamism is not only a condition but a project emphasising both “religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and democracy” (Bayat, 2013: 592). The Arab Spring protests were secular in nature, and there was not widespread support for Islamism, which was being critiqued from within and without, “from seculars and faithfuls alike who felt the deep scars Islamists’ disregard for human rights, tolerance and pluralism had left on the body politic and religious life” (Bayat, 2013: 591). It is within this context that the post-Arab Spring Islamist parties emerged.

There is evidence that the Arab Spring caused a shift towards post-Islamism in Tunisia, following the ousting of Ben Ali’s authoritarian government and the introduction of democratic competition. The Ennahda Party in Tunisia, led by Rached Channouchi, was oppressed under Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, with the marginalisation of piety in favour of secular, western politics. Although the political party was banned in 1992, they continued to operate ‘politically’ in the social sphere in the fields of thought, culture, and education. The diaspora Ennahda members continued communication ensuring the continuity of the movement. The spontaneous nature of the Jasmine Revolution meant the Ennahda Movement was not present during the uprisings, but quickly took advantage due to organizational skills and the fact the revolution was leaderless. Toppling Ben Ali ushering in a new era in Tunisia, where democratic reforms meant there could be political competition. Indeed, it was a provisional government chaired by Ghannouchi that gave amnesty to political prisoners an legalised parties- this already shows that Ennahda was accepting plurality over a singular Islamic voice. The Ennahda Movement received 37% of the vote and came first in the NCA elections in 2011 (Yildrim X). It formed a coalition government and helped write the constitution. Ennahda members discussed and debated including Sharia Law, the open discussion itself suggesting a shift towards post-Islamism, and Ghannouchi concluded that “Islam is a philosophy, not rules”, thus ‘sharia’ was left out of the constitution (Marks, 2014). This pragmatic decision demonstrates the gradualist approach of Ennahda, adapting to the socio-political context in the wake of the Arab Spring, with the vocal civil society groups influencing Ennahda to moderate their views. Similarly, the issue of women’s rights was a contentious issue in the constitution draft, with the initial draft terming women as men’s ‘associates’ or ‘complements’, sparking outrage. Ennahda retracted this language and inserted clear musawa (equality) between the genders. Similarly, Ennahda fought to criminalise blasphemy, but was forced to moderate, resulting in Article 6 of the constitution as upholding huriyya al-dhamir (freedom of conscience) of belief. Though Ennahda remains an Islamist party, it has used strategic choice and responded to pressure from political opposition and secular civil society to ensure it remains a player in the political sphere, taking a calibrated, pragmatic approach. They also look at pressing issues in society such as road and traffic etc. (look some up). This post-Islamic shift was caused by the Arab Spring which toppled the regime and enabled political competition, evidence of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. El-Ghobashy (2005) on MB in Egypt- “even the most ideologically committed and organisationally stalwart parties are transformed in the process of interacting with competitors, citizens, and the state”- participation changes the political behaviour of Islamists. Indeed, 2016 reinvention of the party ‘we are muslim democrats who no longer call for political Islam- this echoes the progression of christian democratic parties that emerged in Europe from Catholic counter-cultural movements in the late 19th century. (go back and add in ‘post-islamist’ lingo)

In many ways, Tunisia seems to have followed a gradualist path towards post-Islamism, where the acceptance of Western political values of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties occurs in small steps. Framing gradualism as working towards maslahah mursalah (Islamic public interest), Ghannouchi (2011) justified secular political choices in Tunisia on the basis of public benefits. This gradualist shift towards a post-Islamist political structure in Tunisia, however, was not representiative of the region.

“Islam and democracy” – Islamist parties are being affected by and in turn having an affect on democratic system.

The post-Islamic shift here is certainly a project, but were the conditions right?

Not all Islamist parties followed a similar pattern in terms of adapting ‘Islamism’ and adopting more moderate stances. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party mobilised support networks and did well at the ‘founding elections’ (look up scholar), winning 47.2% of the vote in January 2012. Similarly to Tunisia, the Brotherhood had been persecuted for many years before the Arab Spring, with members being imprisoned and killed under Mubarak. Where Ennahda used the newfound democratic freedoms to pursue post-Islamic adaptation and moderation, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt remained tied to an eclectic combination of the old beliefs of al-Banna and Qutb and an instrumentalist thinking that limited the Brotherhood to superficial adaptations. The Brotherhood remained shackled to the dream of an ‘Islamic State’ that would bring back the Islamic caliphate, however, in practice, this more closely resembled modernist ideas of authoritarianism, which the Egyptians had shown their aversion to with the toppling of Mubarak (El-Sherif, 2014). Unlike Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood did not adapt their policies to survive in a pluralist democracy. Indeed, Morsi expedited the drafting and passing of a new constitution in 2012, which was widely unpopular. The constitution was ambiguous regarding human rights, minority rights, and freedom of expression, as well as enshrining sharia law as the basis for legislature (Hussein, 2012). Younger members of the Brotherhood who had participated in the Arab Spring protests demanded a larger say in the decision-making. Reformists such as Aboul Fotouh believed there should be conversation and debate regarding the Brotherhood’s political project. However, the old guard was reluctant to accommodate new demands, resulting in the gradual departure of many groups (Drevon, 2017). Ali Ahmad Said Esber (‘Adonis’) in “The Static and the Dynamic” (Al-Thabit wa al-Mutahawwil) (cite), identified two main streams of Islam through which politics is enacted- a conservative static one (al-thabit) and an innovative dynamic one (al-mutahawwil). The Brotherhood in Egypt remained shackled to the forces of al-thabit, resulting in a culture of repetition and emulation that prevented progression towards post-Islamic secular political order. The Muslim Brotherhood did not shift towards post-Islamism in the wake of the Arab Spring, and there was widespread outrage that led to a coup in 2013.

Interestingly, the MB displayed post-Islamism when they won 88/444 seats in 2005 by downplaying religion with the slogan ‘reform is the solution’- the reform of the authoritarian government. However, this was not the case following the Arab Spring. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis does not stand in this case.

Perhaps it was not the Arab Spring that caused a shift towards post-Islamism, as there is evidence of strong post-Islamist trends before 2011. A key example here is the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. While we must be wary that the context is different here to that of Egypt and Tunisia, the Turkish post-Islamist agenda was something of a model for the Muslim world. It was not the Arab Spring that caused the shift towards post-Islamism in Turkey, but a number of other factors. These include…

What are the factors which caused the shift towards post-Islamism in Turkey? Why are they diluting their policy?

The AKP’s party ideology is complex, far from the binary view of Turkey’s political landscape which views the struggle between the AKP and its Kemalist opponents as Islamist versus secular. The AKP supports ‘passive’ American style secularism in opposition to the ‘assertive’ French model of radical secularism the Kemalists have supported since the founding of Turkey. Indeed, it was the Kemalist commitment to secularism that was a key factor in ensuring the Turkish Islamists did not follow a radical path. The evolution from Islamism to post-Islamism in Turkey was a result of this Kemalist intolerance to religion, which played a role in the first coup in 1960, where the democratic government of Prime Minister Menderes was ousted. Menderes while not an Islamist, had adopted a more tolerant policy towards religion, a stance which was seen as a threat by the Kemalist establishment. This coup set a precedent for an autocratic Kemalist order that went on to shut down Erbakan’s National Order Party in 1971 and National Salvation Party following the 1980 coup as their ideology called for the strengthening of Islamic values in Turkey. After the ban on political parties was lifted in 1983, Turgat Ozal formed the Motherland Party. Ozal was a devout Muslim who strongly believed in a Western-style liberal market economy, allowing him to create a social space for religion whilst pursuing pro-Western orientations. It was the Ozalian decade (1983-93) that laid the foundations for the AKP stance which merged personal piety with laissez-faire economy (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013). During this decade, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party, appealing to those marginalised in society, becoming an attractive counter-hegemonic choice for subaltern populations (Yilmaz et al., X). in 1996, Erbakan formed a coalition government and became Prime Minister, however, the military forced him to resign in 1997 and closed down his party. The Virtue Party continued to operate but was also closed down in 2001. The younger generation of Islamists, such as Gül and Erdoğan, had learned from the Islamist experience in Turkey and knew that de jure and de facto constraints imposed by the Kemalists would never allow Islamists to rule Turkey (Çavdar, 2006: 480). Thus the “Muslim Democrat” decade (2001-2013) was ushered in, as Erdoğan’s new AKP performed impressively in the November 2002 elections, gaining 34.4% of votes, rising to 46.4% in 2007. The AKP started reforms that would enable EU accession, challenging the Kemalist pro-West hegemony (Grigoriadis, 2009: 1199). These reforms addressed ethnic and minority issues, economic liberalism, and ‘soft’ power, positioning the AKP not as an ideology-based Islamic party, but a center-right democratic party. The AKP understanding of moderate secularism enables those who are more overtly religiously observant to coexist with those who subscribe to a Western marginalisation of religion to the private sphere. Ahmet Kuru (cite) explores the idea that the AKP acted as a model for Islamist democratisation in the Muslim world. Whilst the AKP’s journey is clearly unique, Kuru notes that the AKP’s distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘assertive’ secularism has influenced other Islamist forces, such as Morocco’s ruling PJD, Tunisia’s Ennahda, and Egypt’s Hizb al-Wasat.

The AKP experience suggests that it was not the Arab Spring that caused the shift to post-Islamism, but that there had been a much earlier trend of Islamist parties adapting and moderating their views in light of the ‘failure of political Islam’ (Roy). Kurzman and Turkoglu (2015) demonstrate this trend by analyzing Islamist party approaches to major political issues associated with both Islamic movements and liberal rights (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). These trends towards post-Islamism have been in motion since the 1970s, not the Arab Spring.

Banu Eligur (cite) argues that the Kemalist military interventions inadvertently served as an ally of the Islamists by introducing a Turkish nationalism with elements of Sunni Islam into state ideology (Bokhari and Senzai, X).

“The triumph of practice over theory and perhaps of the political over the Islamic” (Nasr) this is used to describe the condition where Islamic parties in a competitive democracy seek to win Muslim as well as secular votes, more pragmatic.

Kurzman and Turkoglu, 2015- look at graphs and use them. The AKP has gradually diluted religious aims and adapted manifestos in order to gain more support. ‘Muslim democracy’- now center-right parties with Muslim values but that go beyond purely religious concerns (Nasr, 2005) ‘the triumph of practice over theory’.

The success that the AKP have enjoyed at the ballot box since 2002 demonstrated the popularity of the post-Islamist project, acting as a model to other Islamist parties across the Muslim world- so when the Arab Spring occurred and democracy was ushered in, some were able to follow a similar pathway- so was it the Arab Spring that caused the shift or merely opened up an opportunity for Islamist parties to develop?