The Atomic Bomb: Harbinger of Peace and Destruction

Global tensions rose in 1945 at the height of WWII. Germany surrendered in May, but the Japanese firmly stood their ground, propelled by a strong sense of pride and militaristic empire. With the shadow of Pearl Harbor looming over many Americans and a fear of continuing bloodshed, a decision had to be made regarding the use of the most destructive weapon yet. This decision reached a verdict in August 1945, with the deployment of two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite the havoc these bombs unleashed, using them was the right choice. The bombs were primarily military weapons to bring swift closure to the war. The US gave Japan ample warnings and a chance to unconditionally surrender in the Potsdam Declaration, yet the Japanese did not accept. Ultimately, the bombs were necessary in triggering Japanese surrender by lowering the morale of Japanese citizens and destroying Japanese industry, saving lives on both sides by eliminating the need for further confrontation, and giving the US strength to maintain international order and peace as a global power.

The bomb pushed Japan into surrendering by destroying industries in cities important for warfare and lowering the Japanese will to fight. Compton mentioned, “Experience with the determination of Japan’s fighting men made it evident that the war would not be stopped unless these men themselves were convinced of its futility.” (124) It is clear that, due to a determined personal character, the Japanese would only lose their resolve after a powerful impact. In the aftermath of the bombing, a survey report indicated, “…40% testified to various degrees of defeatism.” Further, “…the reaction was one of resignation.” (243) The bomb had a significant impact on the morale of Japanese survivors, with the general reaction being one of hopelessness and horror, culminating into the loss of a will to fight. Through the eyes of a survivor, Hachiya, “The doctors and nurses, who, could they know the truth, were as helpless as themselves.” Even those dedicated to helping others, ironically, felt as helpless as their patients, making it hard for citizens to garner hope for success in the grim aftermath. The overall environment, Hachiya claimed, made him feel like he was alone in hell. (233) With regard to manufacturing, the bomb destroyed 58% of the yen value of the arms plant and 78% of the steelworks in Nagasaki. The survey noted that even if the war continued, the destroyed plants could take months to restore. (242-243) The production capacity of Nagasaki had been decreased, thereby reducing Japan’s total war capability on the home front and thus, lowering chances for victory. Overall, the profound psychological impact of the bombings on the Japanese, along with the destruction of industries important for producing wartime goods, nudged Japan into surrendering.

The bomb saved lives; American and other lives alike. General Marshall warned Truman that an invasion of Japan to force surrender might cost half a million American lives. (223) Secretary of War Stimson further suggested Japan’s terrain and highly patriotic character would lead to a bitter struggle for the US; worse than in Germany. (168) Japan’s more determined character than Germany, coupled with the rough terrain, would result in more casualties. For empirical data, a presidential meeting recognized the ratio of American to Japanese deaths in previous campaigns to be imbalanced towards the Japanese. For instance, the Battle of Luzon resulted in 5 Japanese deaths for every American death. If the US were to launch an invasion of Kyushu, “through mountainous country… more difficult than it had been in Germany,” (152) the ratios could hold true or possibly increase. The bombs took the lives of many Japanese citizens, yet if fighting were to continue, based on the trends displayed in the presidential meeting, the war losses on both sides could potentially outnumber casualties from the bombs. Additionally, analyzing different perspectives is important. As American soldier Fussell stated, many against the bomb (like John Galbraith), never fought in the war. They made decisions, but they weren’t the ones experiencing the traumatic realities on the battlefield. Fussell also claimed the Japanese would’ve deployed “over 2 million men, plus 10,000 kamikaze planes, in a suicidal defense.” (274) The severity of the deaths wasn’t clear to non-combatants; but to the soldiers, seeing their comrades and enemies fall haunted them. End of the war meant weapons down; no more blood to be shed. Therefore, the use of the atomic bomb effectively prevented the need for further fighting, saving American lives, lives of Allies potentially aiding in an invasion, and Japanese lives (disproportionately so, perhaps due to their kamikaze methods).

The bomb demonstrated the strength of the US as a global power, gave the country leverage, and the ability to maintain peace. Stimson, in his memo, recalled Churchill referring to the bombs as, “this terrible means of maintaining the rule of law in the world.” (239) This suggests the US, in its usage of the bomb, now had the ability to maintain not just domestically, but international order. As Compton claimed before, “…bringing us closer to a time when war would be abandoned as a means of settling international disputes,” (124), the bomb was destructive, but the bloody end it put to the war could kick start a new era in which violence could be avoided altogether. Stimson’s letter to Truman claimed the world accepted the use of the bomb due to the “initiative and productive capacity of the US.” The bomb was a step forward in humanity’s mastering of science and technology, and by harnessing its destructive capabilities effectively, the US demonstrated to other nations its strengths; political and economic (cost of building the bombs) strength, but also intellectual strength. Additionally, the bomb gave the US political leverage, not only with Russia, as evident when Stimson remarked, “…this factor is a most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets,” (270) but also with the Japanese. According to the correspondences between the US and Japan post-surrender (246-247), the US placed the Japanese Emperor subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander to carry out the Potsdam Declaration terms. It is likely the bombs shocked the Japanese into agreeing with this proposition, as initially, the Japanese appeared to not want any form of interference with the emperor (246), yet afterward, they agree to allow the emperor’s rule become subject to the Supreme Commander. Ultimately, the ability to create and use the bomb in ending the war demonstrated America’s strength and made it clear the country was a global power with the capacity to maintain domestic and global law.

Overall, the use of the atomic bomb represented a pivotal yet controversial moment in history, both domestically and internationally. The decision to deploy bombs against Japan attracted relief from proponents like Stimson and Fussell, whereas those against the bomb felt frustrated and disappointed in their country with the end result. Nevertheless, deploying the nuclear weapon was the right choice since it pushed Japan into surrendering, brought closure to the war; thereby saving many lives, and made clear the US’s position as a global power through the demonstration of strength and the gaining of leverage. The advent of nuclear weaponry presented the fact that peace often comes at large sacrifices. That which is inherently destructive can also be a much-desired key to ending war.