The Concept Of Tripartite Soul In Plato's Republic

In Book IV of Plato’s Republic, Socrates claims that within ‘man himself, specifically his soul is occupied by a good and bad principle. He then moves into the inquiry of whether the soul has ‘three generic parts or not’. The methods of inquiry employed are built on a hypothetical argument. So through a hypothetical argument, the position is built from whether every action we do, and Socrates asks whether ‘all our actions alike performed by the one predominantly faculty or are there three faculties operating severally in our different actions.’ The discourse proceeds on whether our faculties are separate or indistinguishable.

Connected to the latter is the Principle of Non-Contrariety or the Principle of Noncontradiction (PNC) stating ‘that nothing can simultaneously have and lack the same property at the same time and in the same part of it being at rest and in motion. Socrates gives an example of a stationary man moving his hands, head, and also of a top spinning, which despite moving, have their axis stationary. Hence, looking into separate distinctive things, and simultaneously having two opposing things which produce two adverse results and then proceeding on the distinctive singularity or not of the three parts of the soul. The argument is built on desires and their reference to the interplay of pursuing the wanting of an object which correlates to mutual opposites through assent and dissent, attraction and repulsion.

The influence of wishes and desires one experiences, and the bearing of reason and the spiritual take Socrates to argue that the soul is not just composed of reason but also of another two parts that do not employ reason: appetite and spirit. Outlining the difference between reason and appetite he concludes that reason drives our rational motivations whilst the appetitive part drives our hunt for satisfying the pleasures of the body. He differentiates between spirit and appetite, concluding that when taken together, the spirit is singled as the third part of the soul. Conflicting and opposing faculties are regularly at play when people make decisions.

Concerning desire, he mentions a thirsty person who refrains from drinking, because reason shows that it is not good or ideal to drink, which in turn shows that reason and desire are different. In the second example, Leontius stops himself (reason or honour) from looking at dead bodies. In the third example, Odysseus chides his heart since it wants to act upon revenge – the spirited side of temperance being distinct, separate, and finer than the irrational component of the soul. If the soul elements were all appetite or all reason, then no conflicts would emerge, but given human beings are comprised of an irrational part and an animalistic aspect, they are susceptible to contradictory desires. Through these three positions, the tripartition case is formed reflecting the city with similar divisions as found in the individual soul.

Alternatively, since the soul has parts and is being called so, the parts could be less separate faculties of desire but closer to approaches that translate to rational, appetitive, or spirited. This dimension is seen in relation to the Principle of Non-Contrariety. The very fact that they are called parts raises the notion that parts originate from some form of unity, perhaps the soul’s unity. These three human psychological states raise the question pertaining to whether these parts happen through a cause – whether they are causal sources within humans. In addition, if there is a causal relationship, cooperation exists among the different forces which influence or go beyond the tripartite formation.

In the context of the principle, having something to be in its entirety or having a part of it at rest, in motion, or to produce opposite things needs to be considered. This argument is associated with appetite and reason-based desires that are indicated as being separate reflections of an object. Consequently questioning whether there is a psychological interpretation to human actions regarding incompatible desires which do not necessitate individual soul parts.

Hence this notion already indicates having a unity of soul, one form (a oneness) existing prior to the same argument. In turn, if the principle is relevant in relation to the soul’s unity and the plurality of the different parts, and whether the principle applies to the whole. Applying the principle to the distinctive elements, though they are dependent, they are faculties that have a causal association to the existence of separate elements. The faculties to which the principle is implemented are wholes in themselves as they still remain as themselves within the plurality condition.

By showing the relationship between the principle and the soul as an inherent internal unity reflects both the embodiment and the separate faculties of the soul. This unity can thus be composed of shape or form, something which is elevated and boundless, hence it cannot be limited. If we consider the shape or form that makes the plurality of elements in light of what Socrates seems to imply – that a thing is not the same as itself, and that a conflicting thing, is not one thing, but more, this points to a sameness: a kind of unity. On the contrary, if a thing is conflicting, it ensues in being divided and hence into a plurality.

Consequently, a contradiction cannot exist because on the one hand there is either one thing that is the same as itself and consistent, or there are a multiplicity of things that are separated. A plurality by itself does not result in a contradiction. If there are two different things that are opposing at the same time, it means that they are not conflicting, they are just operating differently. The principle eliminates sameness and multiplicity at the same time. Without both the sameness and the multiplicity occurring at the same time, and in the same manner, no contradiction occurs and the essence of maintaining the principle is to show that this notion is not occurring. The example of a thirsty person abstaining from drinking shows that a thing drives the person towards an appetite for drinking and yet the same thing cannot drive the person concurrently not to drink. In light of this, there must be an overriding element that is accountable for this refusal to drink. The other element is thus the rational part of the soul.

Demonstrating, that though the soul can be said to be made up of parts as the principle highlights, yet it is the how and what is, that unites the soul as one. What is the object or thing to which the PNC is being applied that results in plurality? As with the drinking example, a contradiction ensues as two separate things move in opposing directions. However, Julia Annas claims that it requires the need to look at human behaviors (cognitive aspect) to show different motivational origins. She claims that discord in motivation though separate shows that parts are urges. She believes that Plato may have been after the discords originating from the ‘nature of motivations’ rather than the actual conflicting objects. With the reference to motivations, she emphasizes how a person relates to the object of desire or repulsion.

These non-conflicting parts are not becoming contradictory despite realizing that there is something that unifies them. So Plato and Socrates may be saying that despite the faculties’ individualities the soul is not being destroyed or changed when applying it to the PNC. Underlying the principle thus there is the soul’s unity, its form, which is embodying the contradiction itself. In actuality, it is not the principle that is contradicting but the principle of unity or the nature of the motivations. Accepting the soul’s tripartition regards that the existence of the soul’s unity despite being a plurality remains one plurality.

Bibliography

1. Annas, Julia, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
2. Bloom, Lawrence, The Principle of Non-contradiction in Plato’s Republic, An Argument for Form (London: Lexington Books, 2017).
3. Cooper, Laurence D., Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the “Republic”, The Review of Politics, 63 (Spring, 2001), pp. 341-372.
4. Davies, John Llewelyn, and Vaughan, David James, Plato Republic (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997).
5. Proudfoot, Michael, and Lacey, A. R., The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy, 4th ed, (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2010).
6. Robinson, Richard, ‘Plato’s Separation of Reason from Desire’, Phronesis, 16 (1971), 38-48.
7. Stalley, R. F., ‘Plato’s Argument for the Division of the Reasoning and Appetitive Elements within the Soul’, Phronesis, 2 (1975), 110-128.