The Notions Of Self And Identity In Early Modern Philosophy

Descartes conceived the anatomy of the human body as a ‘mechanical structure’, maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between itself and its environment in order to function. Animal and plant bodies, as well as their behaviours, were thought of mechanistically.

In his early writings, Descartes accounts for the interaction between the soul and the body in terms of mechanics, making use of, what Lilli Alanen terms, the “ghost-in-the-machine analogy” (Alanen, 1996, p. 4). It is the application of the principles of mechanistic physiology that instigated a split between not simply mind and body, but also between body and nature, ensuing a changed anthropology (Collier, 2001, p. 2).

Consequently, Descartes could not explain all things, primarily the immaterial soul, in terms of mechanics, which was Hobbes’s major criticism. As a result, the new mechanical philosophy had introduced a problem, one which philosophers like Descartes could not resolve; if one is dedicated to mechanical philosophy to explain all phenomena, they thus face the issue of what to do about the soul.

Thomas Hobbes explained that “life is but a motion of the limbs,” introducing his philosophy as a mechanistic account (Hobbes, 1651, p. 1). He described a ‘mechanism’ as self-governing, and that an organism will move toward motives that improve its vital motion (Spohn, 1979, p. 16). His mechanistic axioms were extended to the sensibilities of life, thought, and mind. Theorising that the bodily motions of all living things must result from interior motions (animal spirits), this agency cannot come from an inherent power, rather from external matter, and in turn moves parts of the body. Here, Hobbes essentially begins to explain all of human mentation and soul in terms of motion. Therefore, his primary concepts of ‘bodies in motion’, the artificiality of life, and his analogy between beings and automata, constructs the image of ‘living things’ as merely natural engines (Spohn, 1979, p. 16).

Baruch Spinoza diverged from both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s accounts, considering the mental and the bodily as autonomous entities; this is accepted by Descartes but denied by Hobbes. Consequently, Spinoza was influenced by Descartes’s philosophy, but he is not an orthodox Cartesian. For Spinoza, the human body is an organised union of parts that move as a single entity, individuated not in respect to substance but by motion and rest. Change then becomes a matter of maintenance, the regulation of the distinctive relation between a body’s motion and rest of parts; we will soon see how his idea of ‘motion and rest’ is vital for his theory of ‘identity’ (Garrett, 2003, p. 33). In likeness to Hobbes, Spinoza further theorises that motion and matter were required to explain all things (Spohn, 1979, p. 17).

Individuation and Personal Identity in the Early Modern Period

Personal identity was first understood through an ‘ontological’ approach, defining the individual in terms of body, soul, and other related concepts. This approach was used by Descartes, thus he faced problems of individuation and subjectivity from the same position as the Scholastics, adopting the ontological concepts of substance and mode.

However, the second approach considered individuals based on our conceptualisation of them, producing a more ‘subjectivist’ perspective. Consequently, anti-Cartesian philosophers, like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, recognised the issue of individuality as identity persisting through time, rather than trying to determine an ontological ‘form’ for individual beings (Strazzoni, 2015, p. 5).

Descartes’s Account

Descartes’s account of the individuation of singular and corporeal entities relied on one’s mental capacity to recognise singular objects from our sensations. This, however, is clearly based on Descartes’s assumption that only corporeal substances are a part of an extended continuum. Conversely, in terms of the individuation of the mind, Descartes failed to uphold this subjectivist position, expressing the mind in terms of a singular substance (Strazzoni, 2015, pp. 5-6).

When discussing ‘human nature’, Descartes insisted that it could only be conceived in terms of a substantial union between mind and body, representing his view of the ‘person’ as an embodied and conscious agent (Alanen, 1996, p. 4). Descartes explained that determinate pieces of matter were not what constituted a human being, rather it was the union of matter with a particular soul, because bodies are persistently changing. Even though individual matter changes, it could still be recognised if that matter remained fixed in substantial union with the soul (Nadler, 1988, pp. 237-238). Body and mind were considered as a single individual being, because “to conceive the union between two things is to conceive them as one single thing” (Thiel, 2012, p. 37). For Descartes, the ‘self’ could exist with or without the body, because it was the soul that constituted our very essence.

Instinctively, we must then question what is the correct manner of conceiving this ontological relationship between two apparently and qualitatively distinct sorts of being—mind and body; thought and extension (Mills, 2001, p. 92). Here we can see the primary issue arising—Descartes’s dualism problematises the unity and the identity of the ‘self’ (Alanen, 1996, p. 4).

Central critics, such as Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, found that his notion of the ‘person’ as a union of mind and body to be incoherent and unsatisfactory. The issue was not Elisabeth’s inability to conceive of their union, rather she did not ultimately understand how their interaction was even possible given his original physics; Descartes complicates our conception of the supposed ‘unity’ of the ‘self’ (Tollefsen, 1999, pp. 70-71).

Hobbes rejected this dualistic conception of the subject, believing that Descartes did not distinguish ‘the subject’ from its acts and faculties, outlining that an entity is one thing and its essence is another. For Hobbes, it is more likely that I am a body than an immaterial entity, because it is inconceivable to be aware of my changes in thoughts and being without assuming there is a subject underlying these changes (Bennett, 2017, pp. 42-43). Princess Elisabeth makes this argument as well, recognising that Descartes has not effectively ruled out that being a body is essential to our human nature—Princess Elisabeth was more drawn to the Hobbesian image of the ‘human being’ (Frost, 2005, pp. 496-497).

Spinoza’s monist view profoundly influenced his dismissal of a mind-body interaction, as well as his rejection of dualism’s commitment to the autonomy of the mind (Lin, 2005, p. 245). He avoided the pervading conceptual issues that discredit Descartes’s idea of the ‘self’, escaping the central notions that are problematised by a dualistic framework (i.e. how can we conceive of the ‘self’ existing without a body?) (Rocca, 1993, p. 184). By reconsidering substance, attribute, and mode, Spinoza redefined the fundamental features of the Cartesian framework, achieving the internal consistency that Descartes could not. Only by recognising Cartesian substances in terms of attributes and modes could he remove the independence of extension and thought, while still managing to maintain their qualitative difference (Mills, 2001, pp. 95-96). Spinoza’s radical new understanding of these foundations offered new ontological grounds for conceptualising human beings.

Consequently, because he characterises our existence in terms of the mind, individuation is not considered to have a central role in his definition of the human subject. The issue is not dealt with systematically or in detail, according to Udo Thiel:

“…there is no unitary account of individuation in his writings. He fails, notoriously, to account for the individuality of the soul or mind, and there are several strains in his thought concerning individuality in the material world…” (Thiel, 1997, p. 356)

Moreover, the human body only really maintains its individual nature as long as it is joined to the soul. This then raises the issue regarding the individuality of minds; for Descartes, the individuality of the mind depends on our knowledge of individuality itself. In his Principles of Philosophy, he maintains the notion that the human ‘self’ has a direct consciousness of its own thinking and thus of its own individual existence. However, consciousness is not what individuates the soul, as he merely claims that we acquire this knowledge of individuating minds from this consciousness of our own thoughts (Thiel, 1997, p. 357). Furthermore, through his Meditations, Descartes commits himself to conceiving the I of the cogito as an entity with an apparent continuing identity. Whilst this may be the case, the doctrine of the self as a thinking thing does not explicate a condition for the continuing identity of the soul, thus Descartes inadequately accounts for the individuality of the mind.

However, Edwin McCann strongly suggests that Descartes’s distinction between mind and body assumes the role of yielding a theory of personal identity, even if it does so implicitly. It is naturally instinctive that from Descartes’s central claims we could presume a particular theory of personal identity. More specifically, the immaterial substance theory, which roughly supposes that Y and Z are the same individual in the case that Y and Z are the same immaterial substance. Nevertheless, Descartes does not explicitly articulate a theory of personal identity (McCann, 1986, pp. 458-459).

Descartes’s dualism insisted that the mind and body were quantitatively distinct, preventing the mind and body from constructing a ‘unified’ image of the human being, we are drawn to conceive of a ‘person’ as a mere assortment of distinct things. This is the central issue that we face when establishing an idea of ‘identity’ and ‘individuation’ in terms of Descartes’s dualism, and it is here where we begin to see both Spinoza and Hobbes building on, and responding to, this account.

Hobbes’s Account

Hobbes’s account represents the shift that occurred around the middle of the seventeenth century, moving away from a mostly ontological to a more subjective conception of identity. He denies both the Cartesian and Scholastic metaphysics of man, applying the term ‘person’ to the ‘self’, he introduces the notions of ‘agency’ and ‘authorship’; to constitute as a person one must be the owner of their actions (Thiel, 2012, p. 77).

The shift towards a subjectivist approach occurred in conjunction with another—the shift from the question of individuation to the issue of identity persisting through time. Hobbes’s brief discussion of individuation is restricted to bodies. For Hobbes, his account of individuation is based on one’s existence at a particular place and time (Thiel, 2012, p. 74). As a result, no two bodies are the same, “for seeing they are two, they are in two places at the same time; as that, which is the same, is at the same time in one and the same place” (Hobbes, De corpore in Works, 1962).

Consequently, individuality is non-problematic for Hobbes, so his attention shifts to the issue of identity over time. Due to the denial of substantial forms, it seems highly difficult to determine any one constituent that can be regarded in all cases as essential for preserving identity over time, considering that matter is incessantly changing. However, he constructs a new approach, arguing that one’s identity over time is determined by whether we identify ourselves in terms of our ‘form’ or in terms of our ‘matter’; form and matter rely on different identity criterion.

For example, if we name an individual in regard to their form, the issue of identity is grounded on whether they are the same person at alternate times. Yet if we name the same individual in regard to their matter, then identity is based on whether it is the same body (Thiel, 2012, p. 75). Consequently, Hobbes relays that our judgement about identity is heavily dependent on the manner in which we conceive of an individual; here, Hobbes addresses the issue of ‘conceptual identity’.

However, the main problem with Hobbes’s materialism, is that it consequently reduces the mind to the body. It transfers our notion of the ‘self’ to the ‘matter’ side of Descartes’s dualistic conception, reducing an individual to a mere totality of material parts, bits of matter in motion. Thus, his account also misrepresents ‘thought’ as a form of motion, criticised for overlooking the ultimate disparities between the two sorts, his materialism limits our capacity for self-reflectivity (Frost, 2005, p. 500).

Spinoza’s Account

Spinoza presented an alternative to materialism and dualism, one that deliberately avoided their problematic consequences. Spinoza recognised mind and body as identical, signifying a basic difference between thought and motion, he eliminated their causal relationship, a relationship that instigated conceptual gaps within Descartes’s philosophy. Individuality became a matter of steady pattern and the interaction between parts. Spinoza’s concept of ‘simple bodies’ explained that we retain our individuality despite material changes (i.e. the death and production of cells) in so far as it does not alter our ratio. Similarly, ‘complex bodies’ can withstand alterations within their component parts, (for example the growth of a human heart) as long as the ratio of motion and rest is maintained (Lin, 2005, p. 245).

Spinoza’s substance monism rejected the possibility that the persistence of substance defines personal identity. However, Spinoza’s theory of ‘oneness’ denies the substantiality of the ‘self’, which has been criticised for undermining the foundation to traditional theories of personal immortality. As a result, Leibniz accuses Spinoza of Averroism, for he only acknowledges the existence of one substance, closely resembling the “doctrine of a single universal spirit” (Thiel, 2012, p. 64). His denial of personal immortality could potentially be the reason for not detailing the issue of personal identity in his works, because if there is no personal immortality, identity persisting through time is not a pervading problem.

However, his work on identity commits to his mechanistic account, expressing that a human being retains its identity in so far as its pattern of organisation is maintained (Lin, 2005, p. 254). Furthermore, Spinoza makes a link between personal identity and the continuity of memory, which also relies on the continuity of body. He uses the example of a Spanish poet who cannot recall anything of his past life after recovering from a disease, and he is no longer considered the same man as before (Thiel, 2012, p. 64). Nonetheless, discontinuity of memory does not necessarily suggest a change of ratio. It is important to remember, that for Spinoza, identity is a matter of strict ratio, and not simply connectedness and continuity (Lin, 2005, p. 262).

Contemporary Thinking

In contemporary times, there has been an emergence of more convincing ways of understanding early modern conceptions the ‘self’, replacing long-standing dualistic views. According to Andrea Strazzoni, we are now witnessing a historical reassessment of what were previously loosely defined notions of identity (Strazzoni, 2015, p. 5). Early modern philosophers encountered ontological issues of personal identity, yet these are now being re-formed in epistemological terms, regarding “the identification of the principles or causes that are responsible for making knowers aware of individuals qua individuals.” This epistemologism about individuation leads the contemporary debate (Thiel, 1997, p. 355).

I do not think we can go any further without recognising that a comprehensive contemporary discussion of ‘identity’ cannot be limited to Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, as this does not acknowledge the major contributions of other early modern thinkers, primarily the influence of John Locke. Clearly Locke’s significant contributions to contemporary thinking of the ‘self’ cannot be discussed in its entirety within this portfolio. Regardless, I will mention that Locke was doubtful about Descartes’s dualism, and recognised how it problematised the notion of identity. He refuted the Cartesian account of identity, as he did not believe that an individual was necessarily composed of two distinct substances (McCann, 1986, p. 458). He argues against the immaterial substance theory of personal identity, as well as taking it as obvious that one’s identity could not be tied to a material substance, for bodies are constantly changing. Rather, he insisted that the identity of a person only required psychological unity and stability, occupied by some other substance; this did not necessarily have to be the same substance throughout the lifetime of the individual. Locke proposed the theory that consciousness (memory) is essential to the foundation of our identity through time (Hacker, 2007, p. 297).

How has Descartes’s Dualism Problematised Contemporary Thinking?

In contemporary thought, we recognise the concept of the ‘person’ not so much as a ‘substance concept’, rather one that possesses a distinct assortment of powers, personality, and moral existence. Rendering the influence of Locke, the criteria for personhood requires properties such as self-consciousness, language and communication, freedom of will, and moral agency (Hacker, 2007, p. 297). Conversely, some argue that the body constitutes the most part of an individual’s identity. Hülyar Yaldir argues that within a capitalist society, it makes more sense to assume people strive to construct an identity through their body, as we tend to subconsciously identify individuals materialistically, based on appearance or social situation (Yaldir, 2018, p. 185).

Even within these two contemporary arguments regarding what constitutes personal identity, we can clearly see the legacy of Descartes’s problematic principles. As pointed out by Han van Ruler, the impact of Descartes’s principles of substance provoked the emergence of alternative accounts. Accounts not only of the ‘person’, but also of natural agency (Strazzoni, 2015, p. 6). Contemporary debates realise that our idea of identity and Descartes’s dualism are not mutually exclusive, as conceptual issues of personhood can be understood as direct consequences to the mind-body problem—how should we ultimately conceive of the ‘unity’ of the ‘self’?

Conclusion

Problematised by Descartes through his dualism, contemporary ‘conceptual’ issues of identity continue to be deeply problematic, stemming from the seventeenth-century debate. The early modern agenda of reconsidering human individuality generated far-reaching outcomes, clearly demonstrated through each of the three accounts of individuality presented by Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza.

This portfolio is far from answering complex questions regarding the ‘self’, ‘individuation’, and ‘personal identity’, and I also acknowledge that there is no definitive answer. However, philosophers such as Spinoza and Hobbes have attempted to resolve Descartes’s essential yet often problematic framework for conceiving the ‘self’, each playing a vital role in inducing contemporary considerations of personal identity.