A Short Theoretical Debate Over The EU’s Foreign Policy

One of the main problems within the analysis of the European Union’s foreign policy is the characteristics this policy possesses. Whether we can talk about the EU as an empire by the power of example (Zielonka, 2008, p. 483-485) or an empire in search of a mission (Ungureanu, 2012, p.17-21) , it is obvious that identifying the nature of the EU’s foreign policy is itself the centre of an important debate. At the same time, the definition of the EU as a transformative (Grabbe, 2006), normative (Manners, 2002, p. 238-240) or civil power (Beck, 2013, p. 1-2) are additional elements of controversy and theoretical dispute.

For example, the interpretation of the EU’s foreign policy as that of a normative actor implies that the organization is a different actor by virtue of its goals and objectives, which reflects the need to transfer the norms and values, which are the base of the political organisation of the Union itself. However, the definition of the normative character of the EU is independent of the coercive nature of the measures adopted – the promotion of American values, if necessary, by coercive means does not give the American external action a less normative character (Sjursen, 2005, p. 1-5).

Similarly, the distinction between soft and hard power may prove to be misleading, applied to European foreign policy. The system of conditionalities contained by the European Neighbourhood Policy and the debate on the necessity for a more categorical pursuit of the progress made by the states included in this policy are relevant to a form of political action rather coercive, than ‘seductive’ (Fischer, Lannon, 2011) . Moreover, as the debate on the Eastern Partnership shows, the thought that the EU’s neighborhood policy may prove inefficient, precisely because there is a scarcity of resources to motivate the transformation sought (Shapovalova, 2009); or, the idea of introducing a system where states could be penalised if they do not make progress in the EUs programs (Behr, 2012), tend to outline the coercive nature of the European political action.

However, as Samuel Huntington (1994) or William Odom (1992) show, it is obvious that both the interpretation and the adoption of the policies of the European Union manifest a dichotomy, an apparent contradiction between two different types of action in the international system, as opposed to, for instance, the American foreign policy, where this tension it is not assumed as such and does not create debates of the identical intensity.

The purpose of this essay, however, is not to spot the character of the EU’s foreign policy. Depending on the situation, we can agree on different dimensions and interpretations. For instance, the EU decently possesses a normative dimension – relevant especially when one refers to the enlargement process, as Charillon (2004, p.253 – 255) notes. At the same time, there are situations within which the critical approach can legitimately claim that the EU’s discourse on values is trying to justify a policy based on the rational pursuit of interests (a more realist approach). What is relevant, for the aim of this paper, is that this debate between a logic of adequacy, interests and logic of values is present at the European level and it significantly affects the Union’s foreign policy, especially with respect to the Middle East and the Southern Neighbourhood.

The EU’s foreign policy limits – inconsistency in managing the Southern Neighbourhood

The political and institutional relationship of the European Union to the Middle East region is marked by a contradiction between several ways of acting in international politics, or, better said, an attempt to transition from the pragmatic to the normative model. As Behr (2012, p. 78) argues, regardless of whether it is the Barcelona Process or the French project, finally adopted at the European level – Union for the Mediterranean, the EU’s policy in the region was considered to be one that aimed to maintain stability for the long run, to the detriment of promoting political change or encouraging democratic transformation. However, it can be argued that the EU had initiatives, modest ones, in the region, but they also had elements aimed to promote a transformative formula. Therefore, the logic of improving the economic conditions by negotiating free-trade agreements (all European initiatives for the region have included this type of objectives) can be interpreted as pursuing a typical objective of a liberal vision: economic development produces social transformation which has political consequences (in the sense of a transition to democracy).

The pragmatic or timid attitude of the Union towards this region can be justified, as Khalifa (2012) points out, by the fears that social movements in the region may affect the energy supplies of the EU member states; that an active implication increases the level of immigration or represent the context of the rise of the Islamist movements. Lack of a transient EU reaction to Egypt’s November 2010 elections; the initiation of a dialogue with Libya in 2008; the agreement with Tunisia in May 2010 – all these actions are evidence that the Union’s involvement in the region was timid and pragmatic, where the security considerations prevailed, to the detriment of the ideological ones.

However, the idea that the EU has assumed only a reformatory discourse in response to the social transformations in the region, which has replaced a pragmatic attitude of ‘cohabitation’ with dictatorial regimes, is a brutal way of interpreting the EU policy in the region. We believe that the EU’s hesitations in relation to the Arab Spring could be explained precisely by the fact that the tension present in the European foreign policy was also found in the formulation of a political response to a social phenomenon that was not understood, nor anticipated. In other words, the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring was influenced by the way the EU sees itself and its foreign policy.

The EU’s action in the region must be interpreted considering three factors. Firstly, the difficulties encountered in the process of institutionalizing a European policy in the region is one of the factors that can explain the way the European authorities have reacted to the events triggered in 2010.

Secondly, it should not be overlooked that, at the regional level, the latent tension between European policy and the interests of states produces consequences (it is relevant in this sense that the first reaction to the events came as a joint statement of Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and David Cameron, on January 29, 2011). Similarly, Germany’s position in the case of the Libyan conflict once again highlights the difficulty of reaching a consensus at the European level in terms of foreign policy initiatives.

At the same time, the instruments of the European Union at this level raise the significant problem of the states’ motivation included by these initiatives – both the allocated resources and the purpose of the process can be considered insufficient to support the political or economic transformation in the region.

The construction of a unitary political framework for the Middle East has been the subject of numerous institutional initiatives and projects – the Union for the Mediterranean, launched in 2008 by President Sarkozy is only the last regional initiative after the Global Mediterranean Policy (1975), the renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or the Barcelona Process (1995).

The main criticisms that have been brought to the Mediterranean Partnership are its poor institutionalization – lack of any permanent institutional formulas, including a secretariat (Brocza, 2012) ; economic asymmetry between EU and non-EU states (Attina, 2003, p. 5-7) , respectively “structural asymmetry”. For instance, as Borcza (2012) argues, while the European states act as a coherent group of actors, with complementary interests, the Arab states are divided by political problems that are not related to the European space – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the religious cleavages in the Arab world, etc.). More so, the extremely ambitious objectives of the Partnership, in relation to the available resources, were considered one of the reasons for the failure of the initiative.

It should also be noted that the inclusion of the Mediterranean states in the European Neighbourhood Policy takes place under the strong pressures of France, Spain and Italy. The main differences between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Mediterranean Partnership are represented by the abandonment of the prevalence of the regional dimension in favor of a differentiated bilateralism, as Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, p. 11-12) observe. This approach would, therefore, privilege the states that are able to satisfy the European economic rigors more quickly.

The project of the Mediterranean Union, proposed by Sarkozy in 2007, during his presidential campaign in France, was not received with enthusiasm by all the EU’s MS. Southern members supported the French proposal, while others viewed it with reluctance. Germany, in particular, insisted that any regional interaction formula should include all members of the Union, which eventually happened in 2008, when the Union for the Mediterranean was launched at the Paris Summit. Moreover, all Mediterranean states were part of this Union, except Libya, which refused to participate but received observer status (Koszel, 2014, p. 64-69).

The Union for the Mediterranean was responsible for both the concerns of Spain and Italy, for which the maintenance of the Barcelona Process was itself an objective, as well as for the other European states, which demanded that the project should represent the EU’s interests in the region. The ratio between the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, initiatives launched several months apart, is at best the expression of the compromise between the MS that support the development of the Eastern dimension of the European Union, in relation to the MS for whom the southern dimension should prevail (Miltner, 2011, p. 73-75). However, we believe that this dispute is at the centre of the belief that the EU’s foreign policy is often inconsistent and conflictual. Due to the fact that this pillar is exclusively intergovernmental, the MS often do not share the same views or ideas, giving rise to political divergences. Thus, as it can be seen from the above argument, the Southern states will consider the Mediterranean area to be more important, while the Central and Eastern European countries will promote the EU’s involvement in the Eastern region.

Another factor that contributed to the late reaction of the EU to the Arab Spring, lies in the dynamics of the European institutional process in general. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, marked the formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) . However, its official launch took place a year later, but the first events in Tunisia took place in December 2010. Moreover, the management of the department responsible for the Middle East and the Southern Neighborhood was appointed only on December 21, 2010 – more than ten days after the outbreak of protests in Tunisia (europa.eu, 2010). Institutionally, the EU’s reaction, more than two years after the start of the Arab Spring, was seen as inconsistent.

Overall, the European foreign policy for the region is therefore marked by several problems. First of all, there are times when the contradictions between the positions of the MS practically prevent the adoption of a common position. Secondly, the Southern Neighborhood and Middle East region has been the subject of numerous successive EU initiatives, which are far from setting a unitary attitude or a long-term strategy for managing regional dynamics. Last but not least, the problem of the EU’s objectives cannot be avoided – without being coercive, the European Union’s foreign policy is far from being a „seductive” one, as long as the prospect of accession does not exist for the states in the region.