Moral Beings: Empathy And Sympathy

Introduction:

Empathy and sympathy caused by the pain and distress of others often plays a huge role in the ethical decision making that drives moral action. Therefore, as morality is rooted in empathy the ability to understand and share feelings with another being is fundamental to committing moral acts.

Even complex emotions such as empathy, however, are not limited to humans but are being discovered in an increasing number of species such as rodents (Burkett et al., 2016).

As morality has a basis in empathy, which has now been found in animals other than humans, there is a much-contested debate to whether animals are moral beings.

Throughout this essay I aim to discuss the morality of animals and their capabilities, morality’s roots in empathy and how this can be used to describe rodents as moral beings. Furthermore, I shall then analyse social behaviour such as consolation behaviour and its basis in emotion in rodents. Finally, I shall investigate how laboratory animals as moral subjects may affect experimental data and how this should be considered during experimental design, housing and care.

Animals as moral beings with capabilities:

Morality is the distinction between good and bad actions. We can describe humans as moral agents as they are usually capable of discerning their actions as right or wrong and therefore can be held accountable for those actions. While there is no question that humans are moral beings, arguments are now being made describing animals as moral beings.

A recent paper has defined the term moral subject and how this could be used to describe animals as moral (Rowlands, 2011). He claimed that while there is no evidence to suggest animals have the cognitive abilities to be regarded as moral agents, there is evidence showing that at least some species are capable of acting upon moral emotions such as empathy, sympathy and many others. He then goes on to state that if animals are at least occasionally prompted to make decisions based on moral thought and emotions they should be considered moral subjects.

While it is unlikely model organisms such as drosophila or c. elegans have the capacity to be moral subjects, there is mounting research displaying some species of rodents acting morally without any direct gain through consolation behaviour (Keum and Shin, 2016).

Furthermore, this research has unearthed that animals will provide consolation to discomforted conspecifics, a behaviour that is rooted in empathy within humans.

In addition, Rowlands theory is applicable to several frameworks of animal ethics such as the capabilities approach (Monsó, et al 2018). The capabilities approach states that every animal possesses a series of innate capabilities comprising of what they can do or be, which are essential to thrive as a member of that species (Nussbaum 2005). Therefore, to be unable to partake in these capabilities is harmful. To that end, we can define moral emotions such as empathy as capabilities, evidence of animals providing consolation is an expression of those moral capabilities and therefore, them acting as moral subjects.

Consolation behaviour in rodents:

Consolation behaviour is the act of reducing feelings of distress within another individual. Recent research indicates species with relatively lower levels of cognition such as rodents can display this behaviour, suggesting that these behaviours are due to convergent evolution, not a result of increased cognition (Burkett et al., 2016).

The prairie vole is an example of a rodent capable of consolation behaviour that is being increasingly used in laboratory testing (McGraw and Young, 2010). Additionally, this rise is due to the many different social and mating behaviours they express, which can give great insight into social cognition and empathetic emotions.

Through investigating social behaviour in prairie voles, an experiment examining consolation behaviour after separation discovered that consolation behaviour from one vole to another lasted significantly longer with shorter onset if the vole receiving had been in the presence of a stressor during their separation (Burkett et al., 2016).

However, there was no observable increase in consolation behaviour when conspecifics were reunited without a stressor. This suggests that the consolation response was due to the distress felt by one of the voles. Moreover, this is an example of the prairie vole committing an act based in an empathetic process, showing its capacity to commit moral acts.

Additionally, stressed voles that were not reunited with their partners, thus not receiving consolation, were found to have an increase in stress-like behaviours under normal conditions. In contrast, voles that experienced consolation behaviour showed no increased signs of stress after a length of time, thereby showing a reduction of stress (Burkett et al., 2016). These results were consistent with other studies using rodents (Church 1959; Kikusui, Winslow and Mori, 2006; Smith and Wang, 2014).

Conversely, when repeating this experiment with meadow voles, which have no explicit social structure, they showed no increase in consolation behaviour when their conspecifics exhibited greater levels of stress (Burkett et al., 2016). This suggests that social behaviour is mediated by empathetic processes as there was no empathetic response in the meadow voles.

While these experiments display that prairie voles who received no consolation behaviour exhibited increased stress-like behaviours, they do not discuss or show if observing voles that viewed distressed conspecifics expressed stress-like behaviours themselves when they were not allowed to engage in giving consolation behaviours. If this experiment were repeated with this addition it would give insight into if the observers were being harmed due to not being able to engage in their capabilities. This would be significant because if the animals were being mistreated this would have to be considered during future experimental design to prevent the additional unnecessary harm of animals observing the stress-inducing handling of another subject.

Empathy based mechanisms for emotional contagion:

This experimental evidence using prairie voles is important for displaying that rodents can sense and act on the distress of their conspecifics via consolation behaviour (Burkett et al, 2016). These results were in line with previous research displaying that pain-like behaviours of one mouse directly influenced the pain-like behaviours of another (Langford et al., 2006). While this research is important, neither show that this behaviour is routed in empathy.

However, subsequent research produced strong evidence confirming this behaviour as emotional contagion, a basic form of empathy thereby giving additional weight to the theory of animals as moral beings (Burkett et al., 2016). Emotional contagion is a phenomenon in which the emotions of one individual can trigger the same emotions in another, this occurs in animals as well as humans.

The experiment entailed subjecting one vole to a noxious stimulus while another observed through a pane of glass. The stressed voles would then engage in self-grooming as a calming mechanism in response to the stimulus, this was mimicked by the observing vole, thus increasing self-grooming behaviour in both (Burkett et al. 2016).

Additionally, observer voles displayed state matching as they had elevated blood cortisol levels mirroring the stressed voles. This was because observers were unable to console the stressed voles due to their separation (Burkett et al., 2016).

Conversely, when observer voles were able to engage in consolation behaviour there was no increase in cortisol levels in either vole, displaying that the act of consolation decreased the voles’ physiological responses to stress (Burkett et al., 2016). These findings are relevant as they show the importance of allowing social animals such as prairie voles or possibly other rodents to engage in their capabilities such as empathetic behaviour. Preventing the use of their capabilities could not only affect their wellbeing, but also behaviour and physiology, which in turn could affect or influence experimental data involving these animals.

Another finding of this experiment was that consolation behaviour was not dependant on the observer’s relationship with the stressed vole, displaying that this was genuine empathetic behaviour and not based on kinship. Furthermore, only observers increased their consolation behaviour throughout the experiment, unlike the stressed voles (Burkett et al., 2016). This differential response displays the observer’s ability to identify the source of stress as one coming from the stressed conspecific and not from within. This reveals that the response is complex, and not purely based on if a vole is stressed but where that source of stress is originating from. This further emphasises the voles’ actions as moral and not simply self-serving.

Considering morality during experimental design:

Now that proof of rodents exhibiting emotion through social behaviour has been provided, when taken in conjunction with the theory of animals as moral subjects with capabilities, there are considerable implications (Monsó, et al 2018).

One implication is how we treat rodents within a laboratory environment. For example, rats are extremely complex with a highly sensitive sense of smell, sight and hearing meaning that they can be greatly influenced by their environment and signals from their conspecifics such as ultrasonic vocalisations (Simola and Granon, 2019).

Additionally, the environment a rat is placed in can not only directly affect its senses, but also its behaviour, physiology and its ability to engage in its basic capabilities (Burn, 2008). Therefore, it is extremely important to consider this when designing experiments and the housing and care of laboratory animals.

One example of where this is particularly important is during animal handling where experiments will often involve handing rodents to collect fluid or tissue samples or administer drug treatments. These procedures often require the animal to be restrained, receive painful injections or to be euthanised (Sharp et al. 2003). Furthermore, these procedures are sometimes performed near other rodents that have visual access or the ability to hear their conspecific due to ultrasonic vocalisations (Simola and Granon, 2019).

As we now know that certain rodent species can display emotional contagion when witnessing a distressed conspecific and when capable they will engage with that conspecific to reduce stress, we must consider how their moral capabilities are being impeded when they are unable to console there distressed conspecific (Langford et al. 2006, Burkett et al. 2016).

One way this scenario could be improved is to handle the target subject outside the vicinity where its conspecifics could hear its ultrasonic vocalisations, reducing the harm felt by the observing conspecifics. However, while this approach would prevent the rodents that would have been observing from feeling harmed, it does not consider that although they do not feel harmed, their moral capabilities are still being impeded without their knowledge. In order to prevent blocking the ability of the rodents to engage in moral acts, the handled animal could be placed back with its conspecifics afterwards so that they could console the rodent without the unnecessary harm induced by them waiting to console and viewing of the handling process.

In addition, another area where the moral capabilities of animals are being restricted is due to housing. The ability of an animal to exercise its moral capabilities will depend on the social environment where it can develop and maintain relationships with conspecifics (Monsó, et al 2018). Therefore, a stable social environment without unnecessary separation or isolation should always be available to laboratory rodents unless necessary to prevent animals from being unable to enact their moral capabilities.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, Rowlands theory allows for animals to be treated as moral subjects that possess the ability to act morally even if it is beyond their understanding. Furthermore, we can view the innate abilities of these animals as necessary for them to live a fulfilled life.

Considering this, we can view social behaviours such as consolation behaviour as moral capabilities, rooted in emotional contagion, a basic form of empathy (Burkett et al 2016; Monsó, et al 2018).

As moral capabilities are essential to animal welfare, the ability to partake in these capabilities must be considered during designing housing to allow the development of social relationships so that animals can exercise them. Another area is during the handling of an animal in front of its conspecifics so that observing animals are not harmed due to being unable to console their distressed conspecific.