The Main Ideas Of Russell’s Theory

Russell is right in surmising that we can know about other people’s mental state by analogy with our own experience. He does not prove this beyond the shadow of doubt. Instead he postulates. To postulate means to assume the existence of something as a basis for reasoning. Russell is reasonable in making this argument. Unlike some other philosophers who are forever wrestling with skepticism, Russell uses common sense in using analogy to infer that other people’s feelings and thoughts are probably caused by the same causes as our feelings and thoughts. Russell qualifies his theory by the word “probable.” This is good enough for us. None of us can know anything with absolute certainty, except the Cartesian mind that is doing the thinking. What we want to know from other people is not absolute certainty, but probability. It suffices. The probability that other people are feeling and thinking along the same line as us is sufficient for us to relate to other people with understanding. Russell considers philosophers’ skepticism as being more professional than sincere. Inferring other people’s feelings and thoughts is not merely a scientific activity but an existential necessity. Therefore qualitatively knowing other people’s mind does not require scientific exactitude, but reasonable probability. Russell places a human face on epistemology. Russell’s theory that we can know other people’s thought by analogy is reasonable.

Unlike Laurie Paul, who argues that one cannot know what he has not experienced such as other people’s pain or joy, Russell employs a postulate to know other people’s mind – a postulate which is not required in physical science. Human mind is different from physics because physics concerns itself with physical structure while human thoughts are more of the intrinsic character. This distinction enables Russell to make inference to other people’s thoughts by analogy to my own. This distinction deserves more attention from us. Russell is making a distinction between knowing just physical structure of nature and knowing the thoughts of people with whom we must interact on a daily basis. Russell uses the term “common sense” (Bertrand Russell, p. 89). One cannot basis knowledge of the physical universe on common sense. But he is not discussing the physical universe, but human mind. Endless skepticism has little practical use in trying to guess other people’s feelings and reactions. Russell imagines an example of a philosopher who must know what reaction he can expect from his crossed wife. In human affairs, abstract and object skepticism serves little purpose. It is useless. We can reasonably predict how A would lead to B in other people’s thoughts because in our own experience A leads to B.

Russell is more exact than just blind assumption that the same procedure occurs in other people as in us. He reasons that in our own experience we know that A probably leads to B. There may be other reasons that B takes place other than A, but this is where a postulate comes in. We assume that A is the reason for B. On the basis of this experience, we can infer that when B is in existence in other people, A must be present even if we do not see A. This theory is based on a postulate which is not proved. Hence Russell states “This postulate, if accepted” (Bertrand Russell, p. 91). Thus his argument about knowing other people’s thoughts by analogy has not been proved. Hence he uses the word “probability.” But for our common purposes of estimating other people’s thoughts, it is sufficient to infer by analogy.

Russell’s theory differs from Laurie Paul who argues that one cannot know about other people’s thoughts if he has not experienced them himself. Laurie Paul’s theory would still apply to Russell’s theory for those people who have experienced what others go through. In such a situation, in inference of A from B will work both in the person who has experienced what another has experienced. A causing B model works for both persons. Analogy works. Because something other than A may also have caused B, Russell states that it is “probable” that A has caused B. Thus when B is present, one infer that A must have happened. When there is thunder, one can infer that lightning has stuck even if he has not seen the lightning. Human thoughts and feelings are much more complicated than physical science. There are compound motivations for what people do or say. When one person says to another “Whatever,” that person is not giving a carte blanche to another; instead the person is upset about the other and does not care what the other does. There is an element of sarcasm. In physics, there is no element of sarcasm. For human beings, on the other hand, people react with sarcasm. The way that human beings interact with one another is quite different from the way that machines to, even very smart automama. What Russell is referring to is some kind of a supercomputer. A computer can be programmed to laugh at every one of my jokes, but a human being does not react that way. Human beings do not act like physical structures like stones. Russell’s postulate makes sense. Although it cannot be proved, but its existence enables us to understand human reactions.

Russell has put on the human face on epistemology. Instead of falling into endless skepticism, we can reasonably predict human thoughts and reactions on the basis of our own experience. Because other people’s experiences, thoughts, feelings, and reactions are analogous to our own, we can reasonably suppose that they must have the same antecedent causes as we do. Endless skepticism may be useful in purely academic discourse, but it serves no purpose in human relations. For example, as Russell states, skepticism is useless when a philosopher is expecting words from his crossed wife. It is probable that the same causes produced the anticipated reactions in other people as in us. Nonetheless, some outstanding problems exist in Russell’s theory. Laurie Paul brought up the impossibility of knowing other people unless one has experienced the same things as other people. Paul calls this kind of experience as transformative experience. Russell may have published this study before Laurie Paul. In such a case Laurie Paul’s theory may be incorporated into Russell’s theory. Russell’s analogy has limitations. Unless one has stood in somebody else’s shoes, one has no way of knowing somebody else’s experiences. Analogy works more effectively when one has had a transformative experience. Analogy works better when one is better able to empathize with other people’s pains and experiences. At this point, philosophy and psychology seem to overlap. In an age when the need for genuine community is greater than ever before, the ability to know other people’s feelings and thought is greatly appreciated.