Evolution Of Electoral Voting Patterns From The Mid-20th Century Up Until Today

There is a significant difference between factors that are considered to be accountable for shifts in voting behaviour in the 1950s and those which are commonly cited today. However, some of these present similar characteristics, which is the reason why this divergence in electoral determinants should perhaps be considered a naturalizing evolution rather than a sudden change of paradigm. Starting from the 1950s’ class-driven partisanship support, up to the contemporary prevalence of a historical divide in ideological identification (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 714), these different political scenarios offer a comprehensive overview of shifts in voting behaviour.

This essay will explore the evolution of electoral voting patterns from the mid-20th century up until today, whilst additionally analysing the relevance of a number of determining factors at different points in time. It will argue that the relevance of the sociological approach to voting behaviour, which prioritised class in relation to partisanship, gradually declined following the partial dissolution of traditional class identities. New issue cleavages occupy an increasingly prominent role in the political spectrum, with age prevailing as the key predictor in electoral behaviour.

Up until 1970, the sociological approach to voting behaviour monopolised the field by directing attention to the social characteristics of voters, focusing specifically on their occupational class. During the post-World War II period, election results portrayed a political scenario that saw partisanship as being firmly rooted in the social structure, reflecting the two-party system’s former stability (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 536). People seemed to generally have a stable view of both themselves and of the main political parties (Butler and Stokes, 1969), therefore any significant shift in voting behaviour was likely to be the result of long-term changes in social fabric (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2004: 3).

Between 1945 and 1970, around two-thirds of the working-class electorate consistently voted for the Labour party, whilst approximately three-fourths of the middle-class supported the Conservatives (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 536). These statistics therefore indicate the presence of a strong link between class and electoral behaviour. Moreover, during this timeframe the two main parties averaged 91% of the total vote, (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 537) legitimising Pulzer’s claim that “class is the basis of party politics: all else is embellishment and detail” (1967: 98).

Over the years leading up to the 21st century, a gradual dissolution of traditional class identities shadowed an increase in social mobility. Furthermore, improved standards of living challenged the typology of the social status-quo (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 541), and an increasing number of people occupied miscellaneous “cross-class” positions. Some argue that class identities still persist today, being the “product of material differences among class groups” (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 710), but an overwhelming number of recent studies highlight the declining effectiveness of class as a predictor of voting behaviour (Diamond, Kenny, and Liddle, 2016: 8) as it was formerly determined largely by contrasts in economic policies (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 714), which have now differed. However, subdued aspects entailed by social classification have an impact on a voter’s party perception. For example, the Labour Party has recently increased in popularity among university graduates, whilst routine workers’ support for the Conservatives rose by 8%. (Curtice and Simpson, 2018: 22)

Could the traditional pattern of class-based voting have reversed over time?

In the 1950s, more than three-quarters of voters considered themselves to be attached to one of the two major parties, but over time the link between an individual’s ideological position and their party affiliation appears to have weakened (Sanders and Brynin, 1999: 219), leading to a significant decline in party membership and overall vote share, with both Labour and Conservative support waning from an average of 91% between 1945 and 1970 to 65.1% in the 2015 general election (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 538). A careful analysis of the evolution of partisanship shows a steady increase in electoral volatility, with one million voters switching from Conservative to Labour between 1992 and 1997 (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 538). Partial progression in class dealignment is highlighted by statistics which show middle-class support for the Conservative party dropping from 56% to 41% between 1974 and 2015, and the working classes’ support for Labour decreasing from 57% to 40% in the same timeframe. (Ipsos MORI, 2010, 2015)

The aforementioned decline in partisanship is the consequence of a multitude of different factors, such as the ideological divergence between parties and the electorate, the inability of major parties to deliver on policy commitments, and a climate of rising social and economic inequality. (Diamond, Kenny, and Liddle, 2016: 10) The link that formerly bounded socialisation to class identification (Butler and Stokes), seems to have to given way to a process of political identification born of shared identities and communal cultural backgrounds (Diamond, Kenny, and Liddle, 2016: 8). This pattern explains the recent breakthrough of populist and right-wing parties (Norris, 2011: 34), whilst also discrediting partisanship as a currently applicable explicator of voting behaviour.

This political scenario has undoubtedly favoured the prevalence of a demographic approach to voting behaviour, focused on several short-term and volatile factors, such as economic and governing competence and the voters’ perception of parties and party leaders (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 535, 547). The individual rationality framework is perfectly representative of such approach, and is based on the assumption that party identification is a fluctuating summary of party performance evaluations (Clarke et al., 2004: 12). These are strongly influenced by the voters’ perception of a party’s political and economic “competence” and the level of trust it inspires, which are often the consequences of a leader’s positive character and leadership traits (Clarke et al., 2004: 12). The voter’s discernment of competence-level, whilst often overlooking ideological proximity, strongly relies on objective economic conditions and subjective economic and political perceptions (Sanders and Brynin, 1999: 219), often relating to political stability and to the success of popular policies (Green and Hobolt, 2008: 461).

The gradual decline in relevance of the class cleavage was paramount in establishing the increasing popularity of identity politics, which “politicizes areas of life not previously defined as political” (Kauffman, 1990: 23). These new issue cleavages (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 550) provide insight into objective lifestyle dissimilarities that shape direct and indirect political preferences (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 710), and are of crucial importance to the understanding of the ideological foundations of populist and nationalist parties, such as UKIP and the SNP.

Today, age is commonly considered to be a key predictor in voting behaviour, with some scholars going as far as considering it a substitute of the class cleavage (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 714). This staggering divide in electoral behaviour is thought to be a reflection of generational differences (Clarke et al., 2004: 22), and was perfectly corroborated by the results of the 2017 general elections. An individual is statistically 9 points more likely to vote Conservative with every ten years they age. (Curtice and Simpson, 2018: 22) These differences were highlighted during the 2017 election mainly because of the divergence of party differences regarding policies and media representation on the social liberal-conservative spectrum (Tilley and Evans, 2017: 714). Accordingly, voters aged 18 to 34 were found 32 points more likely to identify with the Labour party, and 33 points less likely to support the Conservatives. (Curtice and Simpson, 2018: 22)

Religious minorities have been a reliable cleavage up until the second half of the 20th century, and continue to be relevant today. In the past, both Anglicans and Protestants were shown to be consistently more likely to support the Conservative party than their non-conformist counterparts (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 546). This trend remains similar and in 2015 Anglicans manifested the same propension, whilst both Roman Catholics and Muslims are more likely to favour the Labour party. ( Election Study, 2015)

Whilst there is a lack of studies regarding the impact of race on voting patterns in the 1950s, a breakdown of recent election results shows that the vote cast by ethnic minorities has a tendency to be related to social and occupational class, and therefore not strongly influenced by race issues (Saggar, 1997:). In 2015, 67% of black voters supported Labour whilst only 21% favoured the Conservatives. Similarly, in regards to the Asian minority, 50% voted for the Labour party, and 38% supported the Conservatives. (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 546-547)

The regional cleavage had a significant role in predicting voting behaviour in the past, as peripheries were famously considered to be Labour strongholds, leaving core parts of the country and the South East of England to the Conservative party. (FIND A SOURCE?) Nonetheless, the ideological divergence between rural and urban areas, as well as the political gap between the North and South of the country, has widened during the last thirty years. Conservative support is disseminated predominantly in the South, among the suburbs, and in rural areas (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 544). Labour support, on the other hand, is predominantly located in Scotland, Wales, Northern England, and in large urban and city areas. (Garnett and Lynch, 2016: 544)

Over the last sixty years, major changes have shaken the once stable foundations of politics, which traditionally relied on predictable partisan behaviour and class identification. Whilst there are some factors dating back to the post-WWII era which are still considered reliable predictors of voting patterns, such as regional differences and religious biases, the age cleavage has perhaps replaced the class cleavage, by reportedly having the greatest impact on the current political scenario.