The Ethics Of Charity: Concluding Kant's Ideas

Concluding Kant

We have already deduced what “Good Charity” should entail, and explored the Kantian ethical theory. Now we must evaluate the Kantian method with regard to its application to charity.

Due to its deontological approach to ethics, Kant focuses on the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of actions, which according to W.D Ross in his book The Right and The Good, renders his theory inflexible and unrealistic. Through a focus on universality of reason, laws must apply to all rational agents as universal, meaning the outcomes have no significance. Ross agrees that when all things have been considered, we have absolute duties, but not all individual duties can be deemed absolute. In Kant’s lectures on ethics, the notion of “Duties to others” is one of the main premises. Here we must highlight the distinction Kant portrays between inclinations and duties. Only acts of duty have moral worth, for example helping the elderly carry their shopping because it is your duty to help another member of society. So, would Kant believe that we “ought” (dutifully) to give to charity, “to make a good on past injustices” (Kant 1785 p193)? In donating to those in genuine need, Kant maintains that we are reconciling, “a restitution”, of an injustice. The injustice is unconscious “because he does not properly examine his own position” (Kant, 1785 p194). Yet, the act of charity is a conscious duty? “although we may be entirely within our rights, according to the law… and social structures, we may be participating in general injustice, and in giving to an unfortunate man we do not give him a gratuity but only help to return to his that of which the general injustice of our system has deprived him” (ibid p195)

Nonetheless, an application of Duty over inclinations is problematic with regard to Charity. Acting from inclination could mean that you instinctively donated a bottle of water to a homeless individual. Kant here would not recognise this as a moral act, and yet it is an act of kindness. Charity must recognise that any act of kindness is moral, of instrumental value and should be praised so that acts of kindness are perpetuated and reciprocal within society. Secondly, his emphasis on duties leads to the problem of conflicting duties. Jean Paul Sartre highlights how these duties may conflict by portraying a situation where an individual is torn between looking after his mother or joining the armed forces (Linsenbard, 2007, P.65-85). Kant is too vague as to how broad our application of our duties should be. Do we have a duty to our family first? Or to society? Similarly, although Kant’s emphasis on Universality seems to maintain a communal focus, it still has certain implications regarding an application to charity. In terms of universalisation, if everyone donated their last £1 then the world would be in a state of poverty. However, if those with financial stability saw it as their duty to donate more on behalf of those who cannot, this could be universalised. Kant fails to establish how broadly we apply universal laws which is problematic for his focus on communal welfare being applicable for an ethics of charity. Via the Principle of the Will, “It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without a qualification, except a good will”. (Kant, 1785 p198). I could donate money to a homeless individual through good will and duty. Despite my good intentions they could spend the money to further a drug addiction that I had no knowledge of. This cannot be universalised and yet the act itself was moral according to Kant because my intention was from good will. As an abstract theory, it is not always easily applicable to moral situations, especially the consideration of all aspects of the Charitable sector. The method tells you what is good, but does not instruct the right thing to do thus it is not always possible to separate intentions of duty from ends. Here Kant’s theory fails aid “Good Charity” as a focus on good actions alone is inclusive of the problem that good acts may produce bad outcomes. A strong ethics of charity should investigate both act and outcome. An analysis that Kant cannot provide.

Despite Kant asserting that humans have intrinsic worth, insuring human rights, the theory still has weaknesses regarding communal welfare. He is notoriously anthropocentric and in the Kantian sense, autonomy is to be seen as the subject acting in accordance to duty rather than through the influence of their desires. However, if their desires are ones of genuine need then there should be no contradiction to human autonomy if the beneficiaries are rationally aware of their genuine need. Kant’s negation of desires is one of the main weaknesses with his theory regarding an application to charity. Desires and empathy perpetuate actions towards the betterment of society through desire on an individual level. We can satisfy desires not necessarily as the recipient of the charitable donations, but through being a better person through donating. But why does donating satisfy our desires without receiving anything? The reply to the question “why do you donate?” is often “I’m giving back” which Kant maintains is not ethical as you ought to give. Firstly, if “giving back”, because you are in a better position than others, is matched to a charitable donation, it negates the philanthropy entirely. Money can be donated but giving back implies that the money was owed or borrowed. We don’t borrow money from charities and as such Kant maintains that we do not owe them. For Kant, we see two falsifications here. Firstly, that you do not deserve the money you have earnt through your work. Secondly that you should be denied the benevolence of the act itself if it truly was owed. If we give to those in need out of self-interest, or set up a charity for self-interest, I am acting through charity as a means to an end. As such these forms of charity would not be of moral value. However, ‘giving back’ could also mean if I am part of a group and enjoy giving something unconditionally to the group just because I am part of it and desire to help. Here, Kant fails to recognise the enjoyment that giving back can and should bring in order to perpetuate communal welfare. To fulfil my own desires in bettering my community. Kant also fails to negate a hierarchy of ‘giving’ as he does not consider the benefit of non-monetary donations. Is it still dutiful to donate unwanted clothes? Or am I using the charity as a means to an end to rid myself of items that I no longer need? Similarly, he cannot provide an analysis of charity based careers. An assistant store manager in a charity shop for “Children’s Hospice South West” can earn up to £8.11 per hour. But are they working from good will or for income? Kant cannot evaluate how necessary evils may work within Charity because he lacks a consequential analysis. However, despite the weaknesses in Kant’s theory, the premise of not using others as a means to an end must be viewed as a strength. Especially if it is further evaluated consequentially rather than deontologically alone with respect to modern charity. This premise can encourage communal stability, bonds, opportunities and aid to provide for those in genuine need, so that acts of kindness are solely for the benefit of others. The reciprocal force of this premise will aid everyone, for although we do not act for our own benefit, others may act towards our well-being which is precisely what modern charity needs.