Concept Of A Dualistic Cosmos In Brie Gertler's Work

What is the pertinence between the mind (nonphysical) and the body (physical)? Are they two separate individual entities as many dualists believe or they are connected as one thing? Brie Gertler says in her essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism that the mind and the body are not one thing, yet they share similar aspects. Gertler rejects physicalism and says that dualism is the only legitimate way to explain how mankind works. Her argument is successful for the most part. Gertler makes her points unambiguous as well as coming up with a counterstatement for every counterargument the physicalists offer. In her essay, Brie Gertler gives rise to the idea of naturalistic dualism and protects the essence of why naturalistic dualism is essential. Gertler’s experiments are based on her cross-examination through probability tests, and her description of what is physical (tangible) and what is mental which is beyond physical understanding.

Brie Gertler composes her argument by using an argument from Descartes in his “Meditations.” She defends this argument and goes into detail by explaining the need for thought. Experiments can be done to explain Dualism in its purest form, the Identity thesis, and the Disembodiment argument (360). Gertler characterizes the concepts of pain, both mental and physical. It has to do with being conscious and subconscious of the world around us. These interpretations prove Naturalistic Dualism exists. Brie Gertler repudiates these criticisms and proves her thesis of a naturalistic and dualistic plane of existence and denies the idea of a physicalist reality, which is materialistic in nature.

The physicalism idea is the most believable hypothesis to the existence of life. It is based on the idea of the identity thesis, which states that every mental state is almost identical to something in the physical state. Many philosophers believe pain has a direct interrelationship to C-fiber stimulation. Pain cannot be experienced without the provocation of these fibers. There are instances that an amputee’s missing appendages can still experience a sensation from the missing appendages even though they no longer have an arm, leg, or toes. The notion of pain can still be remembered and even experienced within a person who no longer possesses appendages with C-fibers. And, if “the damage to one area of the body is merely the ordinary cause of the sensation; the sensation itself is not spatially located to a specific point in the body” (Gertler 360-362). This does not have to be a result of C-fiber stimulation. This insinuates a completely different concept of pain altogether.

Gertler proves physicalism is false by showing that pain can occur in the absence of any physical state. Thought experiments work by using one’s own imagination in which “one performs a thought experiment by attempting to imagine a given scenario, and then carefully reflecting on the outcome of this exercise” (363). Thought experiments are not always guaranteed to be concise, but they may help provide answers to the Disembodiment argument.

The Disembodiment argument moves to show someone can understand something by experiencing pain while disembodied. Most philosophers define the mind-body problem as being “the non-mental” (362). This argument revolves around the concept of pain. Gertler explains that pain can be an experience that requires no unseen significance or fundamental attributes. Pain is a feeling that can be acknowledged as such and does not need further evidence beyond the way it makes you or someone feel. The concept of pain can be thought of without the necessity of physical activity. Therefore, it can be strongly used to benefit Gertler’s thought experiments to explain Mind-Body Dualism. Someone can in fact imagine the sensation of pain without experiencing C-fiber stimulation. This can prove that Dualism exists by proving that the sequence of events can prove that disembodied pain is possible. Gertler has proven that physicalism is flawed to a certain degree where dualism is right in retrospect.

Brie Gertler’s main point in her essay is that Mind-Body Dualism is clearly possible by the cross-examination of disembodied pain. While physicalism explains C-fiber and pain correlation, it does not successfully renounce the circumstance of disembodied pain. (363-366).

Gertler could better her argument by better explaining in more detail the definition of mental. Most physicalists would argue that “mental states are patterns of basic physical phenomena” (367). If this is true, mental visualizations of Gertler’s thought experiments would diminish due to the physically induced constructions of the human brain (363, 365).

In conclusion, the concept of a Dualistic cosmos is one that is not impossible to imagine. The evidence shown through Gertler’s thought experiments shows that pain is a sensation that is not restricted to C-fiber provocation. It is mind-boggling that the impression of emotional pain was never relevant within Gertler’s argument, for it is a feeling that requires no C-fiber stimulation. One should consider the probability that the correlation between pain and C-fiber stimulation may be exceedingly common, but it may not restrict the sensation and feelings of pain experienced within the human psyche.