Philosophy Of Judgement Of Aesthetics In 18th Century

The philosophy of the judgment of aesthetics has been historically dominated by 18th century assertions of ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’. Notable German enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant proposes in his 1790 thesis The Critique of Judgment, that the all-pervading aesthetic experience which transcends one in reverberation to art can be attributed to “reflective judgments” described by the “beautiful” and the “sublime” (Kant, 1790). Secondary to the “sublime” and the “beautiful” is the judgments of the “good” and the “agreeable”. The “good” and the “agreeable” are opposites of sorts, the “good” being a judgment of the ethics of something (within Kantian aesthetics specifically, this is understood as a fixed notion of reason). The “agreeable”, unlike the entirely objective good, the agreeable is its subjective counterpart, with its fundaments in sensory judgments. Contemporary American theorist Sianne Ngai seeks to evolve these precursors of aesthetic classifications, redefining and updating considerations of aesthetic judgment to respond to the post-Marxist, hyper-commoditized culture of the 21st century. In her 2012 book, Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting, Ngai recommends that presently, people are frequently less confident in their aesthetic judgments, reasoning a necessity to re-categorize to fit this passiveness. Seeking a vernacular alternative, she outlines notions of ambivalent experiences: the ‘cute’, the ‘zany’ and the merely ‘interesting’ (Ngai, 2012). Correspondingly, Kant’s judgments and Ngai’s cute, zany and interesting categories all succeed as aesthetic experiences through their exceptionality. The sublime is exceptional in its phantasmagorical transcendence of self, removing conscious conclusions through awe and wonder. Kant’s idea of the “beautiful” is grounded in what Kant brands as “common sense”, the a priori principles of taste. Exceptionality can be found in absolute subjectivity or the absolute objectiveness of the “agreeable” and the “cute”. Zany, cute, and interesting are exceptional in their feeble indifference, an unremarkable experience that encapsulates everyday aesthetic experiences. Superficially, these two groupings of judgments appear polemic in disposition. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of aesthetic thought proposed by Kant are intrinsic to the existence of Ngai’s. Without the contradictions of the powerful beautiful and the weak cute, and the distinction that this supplies, the weaker categories could never survive. Contemporary aesthetic experiences frequently fraternize with emotions, inclusive of the beautiful and the sublime. To some effect, Ngai has redeveloped Kant’s aesthetics with accessibility that reflects the convenience of art in the 21st century.

The Critique of Judgment advocates that aesthetic experiences must be considered a form of judgment. Through his accounts of beauty, Kant explains these “judgments of taste” must-have distinguishing elements that cause them to be diverse from one another (Kant, 1790). The most obviously significant of these to Ngai’s re-development of aesthetic categories is the component of “disinterest” within the judgment of beautiful. For Kant, emotions of disinterest would be distinguished by audiences experiencing pleasure in art as a result of judging it beautiful, rather than judging it beautiful because they have found it pleasurable. Principally, this would suggest an adherence to an apparent predicated universal standard of taste. The influence of philosopher David Hume, and his 1757 essay The Standard of Taste is evident. Hume sets the precedent for this 18th century concept that sentiment in aesthetics holds little value in the judgement of aesthetics, by consequence of the dominance of the concept of a universal taste of beauty (Hume, 1757).

Fundamentally, Ngai’s assertion of the “interesting”, in particular, has built upon the foundations of Kantian disinterest within beauty. “Interesting” as an adjective is ambiguous in its intention – without clarification, this could be understood to be both a compliment and a dismissal. Ngai suggests that if something is interesting it is only a step away from being merely interesting and therefore, disinteresting (Ngai, 2012). However, the passive nature of “interesting” does not require the justification that “beautiful” does, signaling a movement away from an accepted standard of taste and therefore, a development of beautiful into interesting. Grammatically, Kant’s aesthetic judgments are the objective third person, such as declaring “that is beautiful”. Ngai argues that, as a result of such, we cannot respond to the same degree as if someone was to declare something interesting (Ngai, 2012). For Kant, it is fundamental in judging something beautiful that we expect others to agree with us. The discourse that “interesting” inevitably promotes, would infer Ngai’s aesthetic categories have established an importance in opinion, and therefore disagreements within this. This would signify a movement away from a universal “beautiful” to a personal “interesting”.

Similarly, Ngai’s category of the “cute” might also be subject to relying on the elemental feature of passive disinterest. Cute is frequently a marker of contempt and an expression of affection. When we experience something “cute” we may also (be that conscious or not) act cute ourselves in reaction. Konrad Lorenz coined the term “kinderschema” – suggesting typically childish traits realize a “parental release in adults” (Kruger & Miller, 2016). This would indicate that experiencing cuteness is biological to a degree, essentially more individual than its counterpart of “beautiful”. Therefore, personal sentiments in cute are defining of the category, contradicting Kant’s standard of taste. Ngai states that we “lovingly molest” and “aggressively protect” the things we deem cute (Ngai, 2012). Not only does this reaffirm the position of authority we elicit over such things, but also introduces the mixture of both “negative” and “positive” effects. We deem the vulnerable and injured as cute in order to extend this powerful divide between us and objects. Kantian aesthetics would suggest, that instead, the viewer is the vulnerable party, susceptible to an unequaled power of the effect of the art. The things we find cute tend to be powerless in comparison to ourselves whereas the beautiful, and the sublime, evoke a transcendental reaction, they are the dictators of the experience.

Ngai contends that, as an aesthetic category, the “cute” only rises to prominence after beginnings of commodity culture in the late 19th century. More than ever before people can purchase, and own, the visual culture in which they experience and make judgements. With ownership comes authority over the object, something achieved by few in Kant’s world of ‘high art’. Ownership, and even the ability to own consequentially, expose the aesthetic experience to a myriad of weaker emotions. The element of awe found in Kant’s judgments is subdued, ownership of the art allows for close criticism thus, equalling a less wondrous, less intense judgment on the part of the viewer. Western Marxist theorist Walter Benjamin discusses commoditisation within art, suggesting that art should be void of “aura” thus, utilized as a vehicle to promote political agenda or similar (Benjamin, 1937). Capitalism has “compromised art’s authority”, undercutting repetition within art. There is a closeness between commodities and conceptual art. (Leslie, 2000). This has there for opened art up to be a product of capitalism. Benjamin and Ngai are reflecting on eras that are increasingly overwhelmed by an accessibility of art, promoted by globalization and interconnectivity. Japanese kawaii culture , specifically the character Hello Kitty, is the prime example of this. An icon of universally accepted cute, one could attain Hello Kitty paraphernalia almost instantaneously and at little cost. Contrastingly, in the 18th century art was limited to the confines of a specific place, be that the gallery, theatre, or similar. Kant’s experience of art would have been wholly at odds to that of Ngai’s. The ability to easily (and affordably) purchase art, as a commodity, significantly alters the relationship in which we have with the object. We have taken power over art, and therefore power over the aesthetic experience. Western Marxism begins to approach this, through its ideals of art existing alongside us, with more purpose than simply being beautiful. Ngai takes this further; art is often now below us, fundamentally intertwined with sentimental value.

However, Ngai does claim “cute” advances beyond commodities. She suggests that perhaps through ownership we reconsider our authorial position. Poetry specifically proposes a problematic stance within this category. Arguably the most currently esoteric of art forms, avant-garde poetry bridges the gap between Kant’s “beautiful” and Ngai’s “cute”. The difficult nature of critiquing such poetry, Ngai argues, is fundamental to its ambiguity; there is still a significant portion of the “beautiful” within. Theodor Adorno suggests poetry has resisted the urge to be reduced to “objects of fondling” (Adorno, YEAR ). Poetry has resolved to remain as high art in a sense. The implications of this result in a genre that has never, and most likely never will be commoditized to the same means. However, this would not advocate that it does not have its place within the category of cute, albeit through its sentiment rather than its vulnerability and accessibility. Arguably, there is less development between cute and beautiful in the case of avant-garde poetry. Ngai’s places such genre on the fringes of the “cute”, with many properties in fact lending themselves to the “beautiful”.

Ngai suggests when compared with the cute, the interesting can be understood to be “cool” rather than “warm and fuzzy” like the cute. Both equally elicit a response that (in most cases) sets us above the art, a reoccurring motif of Ngai’s categories. Friedrich Schlegel describes the interesting as an “aesthetic of eclectic indifference”, s sense of detachment that may be considered cool (Ngai, 2012). Conceptual art would be the cornerstone of “cool” art, promoting a difference between the known and the “desire to know” (Ngai, 2012). This would directly contrast with Kant’s sensus communis. Kant maintains that “universality and necessity” are a feature of the mind and therefore, there cannot be a single “objective property” that makes something beautiful (Kemal, 1986). Kant’s concepts of “good” and “agreeable” help to resolve this issue of reason. “Good”, through its objectivity, must be reflective of reason, suggesting there is an overlap in beautiful and good. Ngai, through the work of Mikhail Epstein, suggests that interesting is “an effort to bridge the gap between reason and surprise” thus, “rationalizing the improbable” (Ngai, 2012). The “improbable” is reflected in conceptual art, there is a movement away from art being able to be clarified as beautiful (or good) through the craft of the production. Kant discusses the concept of the artist being “genius”, and through such genius, the aesthetic experience is produced. Genius is the talent defines art. Since talent is considered an innate ability of the artist it as such belongs to nature. In Kantian aesthetics, the aesthetic idea appears to correspond with the rational idea. The art must be able to elevate the viewer to the same mindset as the artist. The interesting does not seek the same strength of response.

In some ways, Ngai’s “interesting” might be seen as the paradox of “zany”. Lexically, zany is the opposite of cool. Ngai suggests zany relies on the image of the worker, using the instance of Lucille Ball in I Love Lucy to exemplify this. The relationship between play and work is what sets Zany apart from Ngai’s other categories. Within zaniness, the actor or artist is not only the facilitator of the aesthetic experience but also the vehicle in which the experience is received. Alternatively, Kant suggests that the artist, through his genius, produces a transcendental effect, which acts as the gateway to the experience. The transcendental effect, that epitomizes the ‘sublime’, represents the same position that Lucy takes within I Love Lucy. There is a closeness between experiencers of the zany with the creator that the sublime cannot contend with. Through what Ngai determines as “The Zany Science”, we can understand this category to be political in origin. The relationship between work and play that it depends on is Marxist in tendencies.

The hugest development between Kantian aesthetics and Ngai’s categories would be the ability to act in correspondence with “cute”, zany” and “interesting”. They are all mimetic behaviors in a sense. We can act zany, but we cannot act sublime. Ngai takes her cues in categorization from human experience and emotion, whereas the sublime and the beautiful have their groundings in nature. Kant’s principle argument that there is a secondary affect in the sublime experience other than the sense of overwhelming emotion. Whilst the Zany, the cute, and the interesting can all be considered ‘weaker’ aesthetic experiences compared with the beautiful and the sublime, they can also be seen to be what Ngai describes as “trivial”.

Ngai suggests there has been a desire to move away from what Ngai describes as “the powerfully uplifting” and “shattering” emotions of the beautiful and the sublime. These three aesthetic categories are currently the most suited for grasping how aesthetic experience has been transformed by the hypercommodified conditions of late capitalism and consumerism.